


THE

NATION

MARCH 20, 1976

50 cents



John Holum
The SALT Sell

OR, WHO WILL BELL THE PENTAGON?

The Judges Want a Raise

Geoffrey C. Harbo, Jr.

Reagan's Small Deal

Raymond Wilson

ROBERT MURPHY: CODEBREAKERS' DELIGHT

DAVID KAHN

International Terrorism—The Political Unicorn

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LETTERS

dollar foolish

New York City

In the cause of economy, it is proposed to shut the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, a four-year college in the City University of New York. John Jay, unlike Queens or Brooklyn or City College. . . exists to concentrate education in a few specific fields: criminal justice, fire and police science, and social and civil administration. The students are a mixture of practicing civil servants, young people entering under the City's Open Admissions program and senior citizens. I have taught a class there which included policemen, firemen, a former dope pusher, a pimp, frightened old ladies, a Pentacostal minister, a revolutionary, Black Muslims, a leader of the Attica rebellion, a prison guard at the Tombs and a member of the Birch Society. At the end of the class all knew, liked and respected one another. . . . Social interaction between these groups is a necessity if New York is to come together as a productive functioning place. There are 10,000 students; the budget to run the school is \$15 million, \$5 million of which the City expects to save by dissolving the college and dispersing the students. . . in the system. The point. . . is that \$5 million is cheap for the amount of social progress that is a continuous process at John Jay. . . .

The Board of Higher Education began holding public hearings on March 8, and will vote definitively on the proposal to close John Jay on March 22. There isn't much time.

Abby Zito
Adjunct Lecturer in Art

Gendzier on Israel

New York City

Your February 14th issue, containing an article written by someone who is so ignorant of the issues involved as to title her treatise "The Israeli Debate We Never Hear," and who then proceeds to support it by postulating the existence of a governmental faction in Israel that would favor negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization, indicates that you have begun to lean "Leftward" on the Middle East problem. Following so soon on the heels of the Paul Good article [Dec. 20, 1975] castigating U.N. Ambassador Moynihan and concluding that "Zionism is a delicate issue in the Middle East," the piece by Irene Gendzier is proof as far as I am concerned that *The Nation* no longer stands for the kind of morality in journalism it once did.

Helen Marmor

Brookline, Mass.

I had been following your magazine in the library, but after reading the article by Irene Gendzier, I felt that it was important to express my support for your journal through a subscription.

Professor Gendzier has made a very solid contribution to the understanding of the Israeli debate, and it is to your credit that you are beginning to deal with those aspects which, for the most part, seem to have been neglected in the press. I hope that we can look forward to further articles and clarification of the issues involved.

May Miller

Philadelphia, Pa.

Irene Gendzier's assumption that because there are no strong Jewish voices advocating cooperation with the Palestinians in this country, there are few American Jews holding this position, is a mistake. I, and the majority of my Jewish friends and associates, have felt for a long time that the key to the Middle East peace is recognition and respect between the Israelis and Palestinians, including the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.

Perhaps it is the duty of all Americans to voice their opinions to the government and the media that a policy based on guilt from the past and fear of letting latent anti-Semitism develop is both impractical and unacceptable.

Further, I would be most happy to participate in any group that wishes to state loudly that the American Jewish position on the Middle East is not uniform.

Paul Halpern

Cover drawing: Tachydromos, Greece

EDITORIALS

Season of Change

This may be the time to recall the words of Richard Nixon when, not just as a tourist lately back from Peking but as President, he declared that this nation was in danger of becoming "a pitiful helpless giant." Nixon, of course, was chafing at the restraints that a Congress, at last aroused against an unchecked Presidential war, was trying to impose on his actions in Indochina.

Now, in this political season, we hear on every side complaints that the United States is no longer strong enough to cultivate its own interests in the world. The Pentagon is issuing its annual budget-season comparisons of American and Russian military stature, trying to prove that the armed strength of this country is as that of a banana republic alongside the might of the Soviet Union. And words, slogans and catch phrases are changing with the fashions of the season. "Détente" is out, of course, and it is "peace through strength" that the President thunders from the rostrum. The Secretary of State no longer says we cannot, and will not, "tolerate" Cuban troops fighting abroad. Sitting next to Dean Rusk, of all people, in Atlanta the other day, he said we will not "accept" it, and diplomats around the world will be studying the nuances of that change. At a Senate hearing a few days ago an exasperated Senator Muskie, giving up the effort to parse these diplomacisms, asked Under Secretary of State Sisco, "What in heaven's name is the difference between this and the cold war?" To which Sisco replied that we have an agreement with the Russians on "avoiding thermonuclear war," but that it would be wrong to assume that the Soviet leaders "are going to change their spots." He must have meant that the Russians would continue to stalk us and the rest of "the free world" (remember that old phrase?) in their customary freckled guise.

Meanwhile the Russians have staged their twenty-fifth Communist Party Congress, designed to celebrate the regime of Leonid Brezhnev, and have once again demonstrated the cracks in the monolith. These were well papered over, of course, in an attempt to show the "solidarity" of the Communist world, but division and multi-polarity in that world showed through the tatters of conformity. The Russian party leaders put a good face on it but they had to sit through orations from their comrades in the West that stressed the need to respect democratic freedoms if they were to get anywhere in coalitions with other parties of the Left. The threats to the strict Russian totalitarianism system—especially among their "allies" in Eastern Europe—represented by this opening to the Left in Western Europe must be clear to the old men in the Kremlin.

The governments of the NATO allies of the United States (not to mention the likes of General Haig, as we note below) are worrying about the opposite side of that coin. In France the Left scored impressive gains in the recent cantonal elections. In chaotic Italy the opening to the Left begins to look like a vacuum into which a Left coalition which includes the Communists is rushing. *Time* (March 15) speculates in an essay on what all this por-

tends for the West, and comes to an ambiguous conclusion—that the Communists will probably soon be joining Western governments, that there is not much we can do about it, and that the best policy for the West is one of “vigilant tolerance,” whatever that may imply.

Change is in the air of both East and West as the seasons change. It is scarcely recognized in the campaign speeches of Ford, Reagan, Jackson and Wallace but it exists nonetheless, and there is nothing they can do to make it go away.

Haig Sounds Off

We should keep a vigilant eye on Gen. Alexander Haig, Jr. This most political of American generals, whom President Ford removed from the top spot in the White House after the pardon of Richard Nixon and ill-advisedly sent abroad as NATO commander, has been making highly political statements on matters that should be none of his business as long as he wears his uniform. But what else would one expect of a soldier who was Nixon's last “chief of staff,” the replacement for the martinet in mufti, H.R. Haldeman?

Haig has been saying in Europe that the participation of Communists in the governments of NATO members in Europe would, in the paraphrase of the *Los Angeles Times*, “create serious problems for the alliance.” Earlier accounts of remarks he made at a gathering near Munich within the past month quoted him as using Henry Kissinger's favorite word about Russian and Cuban activity in Africa—that he will not “tolerate” it. When the French Socialists vigorously protested this political advice from the NATO commander, and the French Government had to answer the Socialist objections in parliament, Haig's remarks were “clarified” into the mere creation of a problem rather than the emergence of something not to be tolerated.

The NATO alliance has been a delicate system from the start, full of clashing national sensibilities and held together only by the commonly recognized need to counter Russia's strong Warsaw Pact forces. It has always had an American commander (the first was Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower), in recognition of the United States' preponderant weight in the alliance. From both the military and the political point of view, General Haig is the least qualified, not to say most dubious, of the American commanders. Seven years ago he was a colonel assigned to the staff of then Presidential adviser on national security affairs, Henry Kissinger. He was a staff officer with a short and undistinguished record as a commander of troops. Kissinger and his patron Nixon pushed Haig ahead of his contemporaries in the Army at an extraordinary pace: in a short time this military bureaucrat was wearing four stars and was Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Nixon, after the debacle of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, et al., and in the dying days of his regime, plucked Haig from that spot in the Pentagon and put him in a post where he virtually ran the country's government, while Nixon struggled to avoid disgrace. The record is still far from clear, but there is strong evidence that he served as go-between for Nixon and Ford in ar-

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ranging the deplorable pardon of the former President. In other words, Haig learned his politics from the most tainted of teachers, but he learned them well. The traditional separation of the American military from the country's political processes is something Haig may remember from his lectures at West Point but which he managed to forget in his days as a national security bureaucrat.

Now he is applying those lessons as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, making policy instead of applying the directives he gets from his civilian superiors in the NATO alliance. The West, he recently said, "must develop the ability to manage in a global sense." What he meant by that Delphic remark is clear from another recent statement, made in connection with events in the Third World. "Western power," he declared, "must be applied and must be perceptibly applied," in order to stave off a more serious confrontation (which he suggests would have to be nuclear in nature because of what he sees as the West's relative weakness in conventional forces).

These purely political ruminations by an American general who occupies a key role in our most important alliance are no doubt encouraged by the vacuum of sense and leadership in Washington. Since the government itself offers no serious policy making, generals and others are bound to rush into the empty spaces of policy. But that is not a good enough excuse for Haig's irresponsible statements on "global" commitments by the United States and its allies. He represents a truly dangerous trend.

Low Swirl

In the Florida primary, as unappealing and irrelevant an election as we have lately seen, the one man who may have gained ground was Hubert Humphrey, who was not on the ballot. The argument goes like this:

Wallace, despite his trimming by Carter, will stay in the race to the end but will fall far short of enough delegates. If two others make it to the convention (Carter and Jackson), one of them will get the nomination—very likely Carter, who can attract some liberal delegates (Jackson, for good reason, is simply unacceptable). If three others besides Wallace bring live candidacies to the July convention (add Udall), then it will be a "brokered" convention, arranged in advance. Humphrey, the second choice of most factions, would be the probable winner in that process.

This analysis, or guess, is based on a grim view of the Democratic realities. The one candidate who, on the issues, merits support is Udall. But lackluster is a kind word for his campaign so far. He has somehow arranged things so that he will be almost invisible until April 6, and on that date he will be making his play in Wisconsin, where he will do predictably well, and not in New York where the delegates are. The reporting on his campaign will be either minimal or mean and trivial (staff disorganization, lack of money), and it will hurt. He seems to be languidly swimming out of the public ken.

In a few days Sen. Frank Church will jump into the candidate pool, from the left bank. He will make a small

splash, but whatever waves Church thinks he can generate will wash over Udall and perhaps drown him. Church's calculation, of course, is that he will replace the sinking Udall, but he is wrong. It is too late for that; he will merely have helped to submerge the only liberal still afloat. So Church's hopeless quest would have the further effect of eliminating Humphrey, the Great Second Choice. Carter would be the beneficiary. Is that what Church wants?

The columnist Joseph Kraft, citing Prof. Walter Dean Burnham of M.I.T. on how no clear shift has yet happened in our politics, wrote that it will take a while for the "swirling process" to work that change.

It's a low swirl. And depressing.

Drip, Drip, Drip

The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct inadvertently chose an odd week in which to begin its labors on the Congressional "leak" of, to, by or from Daniel Schorr. It was the week in which *Foreign Policy* carried an article revealing very specific inside knowledge (including verbatim quotes or minutes from conversations with Middle Eastern leaders), of the "genius" of Henry Kissinger. (The author of the article, Edward Sheehan, a former foreign service officer, after two conversations with the Secretary of State, describes Kissinger as "at the apogee of his genius" in handling the matter of war and peace in the Middle East.) The extravagant compliment is one notoriously reliable giveaway of a hidden source.

Sheehan, who talked with several policy people in the State Department, will not say who provided the circumstantial tidbits and Kissinger, incredibly enough, denies any knowledge that they had been divulged—that is, leaked. He has to because he has been thundering against leaks from Congress on "national security" matters. And now that *Foreign Policy* has spread his "genius" before the world (it seems to have consisted substantially of telling the Arabs that the United States was going to pressure the Israelis into withdrawal from occupied territory), Kissinger is calling the seepage from his own shop "gross," both as to "breach of confidence" and to "error of judgment."

Now, there are various kinds of leaks, as we are learning with every day's news. There are leaks that are good for the country and leaks that are bad. The good leaks, otherwise known as "authorized leaks," tend to shed luster on the leaker, always a "high official" of the administration. Henry Kissinger is the world champion of this sport. In his various disguises for the role, he has played "a high official on the plane" (when he's shuttling), "a high State Department official" or "high administration sources"—whether on the ground or in the air, he is always "high."

The bad leaks, the "gross" ones, are those that let Congress and the public in on information to which the administration does not feel they should be privy—generally showing its activities to be discreditable, dangerous or less than brilliant. Some of the grosser ones are contained in a book by the Israeli journalist Matti Golan, initially stopped from publication by Israel's military censors but now, for unexplained reasons, released. The

book may make the Secretary of State prefer the Golan Heights, with all the problems it has given him, to the author of the same name. This work contains a classic example of Kissinger's philosophy of porousness in international relations.

At a delicate moment in U.S.-Israel negotiations on the question of withdrawal from the Golan Heights, an Israeli diplomat "delicately commented" that the troublesome leaks from these tense talks seemed to be coming from the American side. Thereupon Kissinger "went wild," Golan writes. "'You blame the Americans?' he asked incredulously. The journalists who accompanied him, he said, knew nothing except what he told them. And he only told them what served the negotiations." Two groups have a right to be annoyed at the American Secretary of State's egocentrism in this incident—the Israelis, who must have had a different view of what "served the negotiations," and the American journalists, who were being so boldly used by Kissinger for his own purposes.

It is against this background that the House committee prepares to explore how one reporter, Daniel Schorr of CBS News, managed to get hold of, keep and have published a copy of the Pike Committee's report on intelligence operations, more than 2,000 of which were floating around Washington until the House, paralyzed by the executive branch's intimidation by leak, decided to bow to the pressure and bury the report. The House "ethics" committee, as it is known for short, which had no staff and no observable function until the Schorr case came along, is now authorized to hire a staff of twenty-five and spend \$350,000 to tackle one lone reporter. It is even considering "contempt" citations if it can find

anyone on whom to pin the charge. The rest of us may be tempted to find another and more general use of the term "contempt" and apply it to the executive branch and its systematic use and abuse of leaking for its own purposes.

Happy Day for Lyndon

Speaking of Presidents as Commanders in Chief (and they are always in that role, war or no war, which is what gave the Ford threat to Castro its weight), the current issue of the *Armed Forces Journal* has an amazing tale of how the military conned a President. Lyndon B. Johnson was the victim of the ruse eight years ago when he made a sudden visit to Fort Bragg to see off to Vietnam some troops of the 82nd Airborne Division, ordered to reinforce American forces there during the Tet offensive.

The troops who were actually scheduled to leave the next day were having an authorized last fling, complete with barrels of beer, and were in no condition to be reviewed by their Commander in Chief. So the quick-thinking brass mustered a contingent just *back* from Vietnam. The President reviewed them and stood with tears in his eyes, saying "Your President is proud of you" as the bewildered veterans of Indochina were hustled onto the transport plane. It circled around and came down as soon as Johnson had left Fort Bragg; the real contingent took off for Saigon as scheduled.

The moral, if any, is that the military can usually pull the khaki over a President's eyes, especially if they are filled with sentimental tears or fixed on visions of glory.

Robert Murphy: Codebreakers' Delight

David Kahn

Mr. Ford has named as head of the new intelligence oversight panel a man, Robert Murphy, who, during World War II, demonstrated an ineptitude and an indifference to intelligence that may have cost American lives. In my book, *The Codebreakers*, published in 1967, I wrote substantially as follows:

In 1941 and 1942, Murphy, a career diplomat, was in North Africa. He was handling delicate negotiations with the Vichy French and paving the way for the Allied invasion of North Africa. He communicated with Washington in the State Department codes.

Now, as an Ambassador of those days said, "It was common gossip that the State Department codes were insecure." They were old and obsolete and were, as a consequence, little better than what one-time code clerk James Thurber called them: "quaint transparencies, . . . intended to save words and cut telegraph costs, not to fool anybody." President Roosevelt recognized this and

communicated with his ambassadors in London and Moscow and with Prime Minister Churchill via Navy Department cryptosystems.

But Robert Murphy evidently feared American reading of his messages more than German. Even though officers on General Eisenhower's staff warned him of the insecurity of his codes, he insisted on using them to preserve his autonomy. He did indeed keep his secrets from the U.S. Army—but not from the Germans.

In Berlin, the cryptanalysts of the Foreign Office had cracked the code he was using. They could recognize the groups meaning "For Murphy" or "From Murphy" that recurred at the head of so many telegrams. "We knew what he was interested in, and this gave us clues," said one of these codebreakers, Miss Asta Friedrichs. In fact, his communications so facilitated her work, she said, that when she saw him drive by one day after the war while she was interned in Marburg, "I wanted to stop him and shake his hand."

Thus, as early as August 12, 1941, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop received fully solved copies of Murphy's telegrams of July 21 and August 2. The

David Kahn, assistant professor of journalism at New York University, is the author of *The Codebreakers* (Macmillan/New American Library).

first reported that Murphy had transmitted Roosevelt's views on French North Africa to Gen. Maxime Weygand, commanding there. The second transmitted a Weygand aide's request for an American promise of military assistance.

The Nazis knew that Weygand was no friend of theirs, but it was not until they had what a Vichy source called "documentary proof" of his dealings with the United States that they forced Vichy to dismiss him. Thus the solution of a pigheaded diplomat's messages cost the

United States much valuable time and work in that it was forced to recommence with the new leaders of French North Africa, and may ultimately have prolonged the war and cost the lives of American soldiers.

Nor did Murphy ever learn. He would not at the time believe that the Germans might have broken his codes, and in 1959, when the German documents were made public, he still refused to credit it. This is the man, the sensitive, subtle and clever man, who now oversees America's foreign intelligence.

THE 'SALT' SELL

Or, Who Will Bell the Pentagon?

JOHN HOLUM

"The best SALT agreement would be one in which we were allowed to build everything we wanted, and the Russians were required to give up everything they had."

—Pentagon spokesman

Quite soon, we are told, President Ford will be able to announce that yet another concrete agreement has been reached in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. In January, Secretary of State Kissinger returned from Moscow with new concessions on the two issues—the Soviet "Backfire" bomber and the U.S. strategic cruise missile—that had unsettled the agreement President Ford had supposedly made at Vladivostok in November of 1974. The Russians will limit the range of Backfire to keep it out of the strategic realm. And they will accept, up to a range of 1,500 miles, the strategic cruise missile we have recently become hell-bent to build.

So there it is; a ceiling on delivery vehicles, perhaps down to 2,200 from the 2,400 set at Vladivostok; a sub-ceiling of 1,320 on vehicles that can carry multiple independently targetable warheads; the thorny problems of Backfire and cruise missiles dealt with; a ten-year accord; Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev reporting progress at the party congress February 24; Ford playing the stern but successful statesman in his political competition with Governor Reagan.

But it is not that easy. In fact, the SALT II agreement will bear heavily on our politics this year—so much so that Secretary Kissinger reportedly wanted to postpone any final agreement until after the election, to avoid the inevitable attacks from the Right. It was Brezhnev who pushed for an early deal, for his own internal political reasons.

The agreement also creates a dilemma for Democrats, especially those on the Left. It is easy to welcome any progress, however slight, toward braking the ludicrous accumulation of American and Soviet overkill. But what have we really to show for all the hopes pinned on SALT?

John Holum, a fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard University, has been a legislative assistant and foreign policy adviser to Sen. George McGovern since 1965.

Is this agreement worth defending? If not, what else might be proposed?

Start with the Ford-Reagan race. Scarcely 18 per cent of eligible American voters are now willing to call themselves "Republican." A fraction of that fraction will actually participate in primaries and caucuses. The party is moving closer and closer to its narrow, right-wing ideological core, and that is who will choose between Reagan and Ford. Rhetorically, at least, détente is the only substantive point of difference between them. And there is no reason to suppose that the shrunken GOP rank and file will think more of Ford for his accommodations with the Russians. Most of them would sooner make a pact with the devil.

Reagan is aware of that opening, of course. He launched a pre-emptive strike on SALT II in Exeter, N.H., February 10, during what was billed as a major address on international affairs. He said U.S. foreign policy "seems to be a matter of placating potential adversaries." On SALT:

We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength than we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to enter a SALT II agreement. They have a reason to be worried about a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge technological lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise missile. . . . We should not be so eager for an agreement that we make unnecessary concessions, for to grant such concessions is to whet the Soviet appetite for more.

That sort of thinking makes arms controllers groan, but it will sell well among the conservative activists that Ford and Reagan are trying to reach.

And Ford will be besieged from the same general direction on the Democratic side, at least by Senator Jackson. While he paints himself as a liberal on domestic issues, Jackson willingly separates himself from the pack on defense and foreign policy matters, to line up squarely with the hawkish wing of his party. Now he has the broader interest of discrediting Ford on precisely this issue. His words will carry weight in the GOP nomination contest, which Jackson would be more delighted than anyone to see Reagan win. Jackson, if he were to capture

the Democratic nomination, would have almost no chance of keeping liberals in the fold next fall—unless he could demonstrate that he was the lesser, by far, of two evils. He probably cannot make that case against Ford, but Reagan strikes genuine terror.

Unlike Jackson, most of the Democratic candidates have records of challenging bloated arms budgets and of urging negotiated arms limits as an alternative to an escalating balance of terror. What about them? What about the constituency for arms control? Is there no choice but to side with Ford against attack from the Republican and Democratic right wings?

The answer lies in a more discriminating evaluation of the SALT process. I think Democrats who want to address this issue responsibly will be forced to devise new approaches. For as practiced by Nixon, Ford and Kissinger, SALT has been worse than a failure. Both the process and the results have actually damaged, possibly destroyed, the prospects for meaningful negotiated limits on strategic arms. Indeed, it is among the most pernicious works of the Nixon-Ford administrations that they have squandered so many chances for reducing the military hardware and have shoved so much of the arms race beyond the reach of *de jure* control. It is plain foolish for any Democratic candidate or any true believer in arms control to follow some misplaced sense of duty into defending this latest accord.

The first danger signals were sounded well ahead of the Nixon administration, of course. In a 1962 speech at Ann Arbor, then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara began the search for flexibility in nuclear war. He outlined a "no cities" policy, under which it was assumed that the two sides would first fire at each other's weapons (counterforce), and that a nuclear war could then be stopped before the ultimate holocaust occurred.


The trouble was that counterforce weapons are inherently ambiguous. Weapons accurate enough for a retaliatory second strike at Russian missiles would also be accurate enough for a disarming first strike. Until then the central purpose of our nuclear arsenal had been deterrence—to notify the other side that if it struck first, we could inflict unacceptable damage in return. It was a relatively stable situation, with the debate focused not so much on the essentials of strategy as on the question, "how much is enough" to deter nuclear war. But McNamara opened something new. If we were not explicitly talking about a first-strike strategy, we were, under a humanitarian-sounding "no cities" rubric, beginning to talk about weapons that could deny to the Soviet Union the minimum safety we demanded for ourselves—a secure deterrent force.

But in 1962 it was only talk. By the late 1960s it was becoming a threat. The Army was pushing anti-ballistic missiles (ABM), which were supposed to intercept incoming warheads from the other side. At the same time, we were preparing to test multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs, which are a method of multiplying each missile into several warheads—up to twelve or fourteen on Poseidon submarine-launched missiles—and to send each warhead to a separate target. In

combination, those two developments made it possible to conceive of someone actually winning a nuclear war. With the benefit of surprise, one side could send highly accurate and numerous MIRVs to knock out the other side's land-based missiles in their silos, then catch their sub-launched missiles with the ABM, and limit damage to acceptable levels.

It still would not be something to undertake lightly, of course, since there would be enormous damage to the attacker—the incineration of New York City or Moscow, for example—if even a few retaliatory missiles got through. But nuclear scenario builders make fine distinctions. In the January issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Paul Nitze measures the adequacy of our posture by calculating how much nuclear force each side would have left after each had fired two or three salvos at the other. In the real world that has no relevance except to people who plan to be ensconced far underground, pushing buttons when it all takes place. But if both sides had MIRVs and ABMs, those same people, in both Washington and Moscow, would certainly see a great advantage to the side striking first. In any crisis it would be vastly easier to slip into nuclear war. Instead of both losing, one—the side attacking first—would chalk up a relative win.

SALT I is widely credited with averting that ominous prospect, because an ABM was thought essential to a plausible first-strike strategy and the agreement ruled out ABMs. But look again. When the SALT talks got underway, the Soviet Union had long since left off construction of its own primitive ABM system—the GALOSH—around Moscow. And in the United States, by 1969, there was enough doubt about whether the thing would work, and enough concern about the arms race implications, to produce a tie vote in the U.S. Senate on our ABM. And that vote came on the concept of a "hard point" ABM, designed to protect only missile sites, not population centers; the Nixon administration knew it was hopeless to try to get the whole system past Congress. So the ABM was about to be defeated anyway. The main contribution to SALT I was to keep it alive for two more years as a "bargaining chip." (After spending something between \$5 billion and \$6 billion, Congress finally voted last November to mothball the Grand Forks, N.D. ABM site, to save at least the operating costs of a system which had never made any military sense.)



Valtman

This has been the pattern of SALT. The hard bargaining has been not with the Russians but with the Pentagon. The arms controllers have lost every bureaucratic fight, and the military has not had to give up anything on arms-control grounds that it otherwise would have had.

The point is better illustrated by what was left out of SALT I. With the advent of MIRV, the quantitative race, which was covered by SALT I, had lost much of its relevance. Anyone can build more missiles. The real excitement, and the best chance to stay ahead, was in the qualitative race, which was not controlled.

In 1969, when our MIRV program had reached the flight testing stage, Senators Case, Brooke and others pleaded for at least a postponement of the tests, pending discussions in SALT. There was no military need to go ahead, since we already had the capacity to destroy any adversary several times over, several different ways—with bombers, with missiles based on land (ICBMs), and missiles on submarines (SLBMs). The Soviet Union was years away from testing a similar program. Further, MIRV raised the first-strike threat outlined above, and it also posed enormous problems for unilateral policing of any arms-control agreement. Sponsors of amendments to delay MIRV pointed out that each side's satellites can count how many missiles the other side has, but that even the most sensitive camera cannot look inside the cover and count how many warheads are there. Once ours was tested, they said, the Soviet Union would have to assume it had been mounted everywhere it would fit. Then they would build the same thing, costs would go up, risks would rise, and arms control would be harder—all for no net gain.

But those warnings went unheeded. Despite the fact that SALT negotiations were underway—and in part because of it, because MIRV, in turn, became a "bargaining chip"—amendments to postpone the tests were defeated. Since then, twenty-seven of our forty-one ballistic missile submarines, each with sixteen missiles, have been loaded with MIRVs, as have 550 of our Minuteman ICBMs. The total number of individual weapons—bomber loadings and independently targetable warheads—is now projected at 8,900, climbing toward almost 10,000. That's more than twice what it was in 1970. It is enough to hit every major urban or industrial center in the Soviet Union fifty times over, with warheads roughly the size of the one that blasted Hiroshima.

At the same time, under Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, the McNamara counterforce theory was broadened and hardened into policy. If we have been spared the ABM, today's targeting doctrines, no matter how implausible, conveniently build the case for more and more accuracy and for mountains of costly overkill. If we want to aim at weapons and military installations as well as at cities, then no matter how big the arsenal, the Pentagon can always claim it isn't enough. The doctrine itself is wrong, but if they can keep the debate within the doctrine, the Pentagon can make a military case for rising budgets forever. In the process they can argue that any arms-control agreement, almost by definition, is strategically bad.

Now, five years later, as predicted, the Russians are beginning to build MIRVs of their own. Pentagon spokesmen point to that development to justify a jump of more

than \$2 billion next year in spending to design, buy and operate nuclear weapons. They do not acknowledge that Soviet MIRVs probably could have been avoided, if only we had been willing to show some restraint. But because of our quantum jump, the best that could be achieved at SALT II was a limit of 1,320 MIRVed missiles per side.

It should have said "none"—no MIRV deployments, and no flight tests, to make sure there would be no deployment. But the arms builders won the day over the arms controllers. The agreement is designed not to limit arms but to fit around Pentagon plans to build them.

Secretary of State Kissinger has complained of this around Washington, particularly in the context of his discussions preliminary to President Ford's Vladivostok trip in November 1974. Columnists were writing then about the State-Defense split over SALT. Kissinger was embarrassed in Moscow because he had to incorporate in his conversations these Pentagon claims that the Russians are ahead in missile throw-weights. They do have bigger missiles. But they responded, quite correctly, that missiles don't kill people; warheads kill people, and in that category the United States, with its early MIRV, had an overwhelming lead.

But if he complained to columnists and Congressmen, Kissinger apparently did not complain with much effect to President Nixon or President Ford. For now something even more unsettling than MIRV has virtually been excluded from SALT. This spring both the Navy and Air Force are slated to test advanced strategic cruise missiles—systems which make MIRV look like a piker's arms-control problem.

The cruise missile is not a new concept; it is as old as the V-1 rockets used by the Germans in World War II. But advances in technology have transformed it into an extremely formidable carrier for nuclear weapons—advances which are, for the present, exclusively ours.

Cruise missiles are essentially pilotless aircraft with either a conventional or nuclear nose. They could be launched from airplanes, from attack submarines, from surface ships or even from land. They would fly just above the terrain to avoid radar detection. New terminal guidance systems can give them near pinpoint accuracy. And, if you discount the cost of the launch platform, they are comparatively cheap—under \$1 million per copy, even allowing for overruns and inflation.

The arms-control problems are obvious. With MIRVs one can at least count launchers and calculate the maximum force. But cruise missiles—especially the sea-launched version, SLCM (for acronym buffs, that's pronounced "slick-em")—could be literally anywhere and everywhere, and there would be no way to know.

Yet the Pentagon wants to go ahead now. Harking back to Senator Case's 1969 attack on MIRV, Senator McGovern tried late last year to amend the Pentagon's money bill so as to postpone cruise missile flight tests until a total SALT ban had been tried. The Pentagon lobby cranked up to defeat it, and did. Secretary Kissinger went to Moscow in January to argue dutifully that cruise missiles must be allowed. Any State-Pentagon difference on this one somehow disappeared.

Of course there is the 1,500 mile limit on range in SALT II. But if it has some engineering effects, that figure has virtually no practical political meaning. For enforcement purposes in SALT, each side must assume that the other wants to cheat. A side bent on doing so could limit its cruise missile tests to 1,500 miles and still deploy longer-range versions, with high confidence that all aspects would work. As with MIRV, the only way to stop the cruise missile is in the testing stage. Instead, SALT II legitimized cruise missiles—ours and ultimately the Russians'—and effectively excluded them from enforceable limits.

That may be the final blow for SALT. (The negotiations have left out most of the race, and it is too late to restrain it that way.) Perhaps the discussions are not entirely useless. But neither are they terribly relevant. At least, given the current U.S. approach, there is very little they can affect—only what the Pentagon does not want or cannot get anyway.

The problem is that in practice we have repudiated the one workable foundation for arms control—the starting conviction that both sides share an interest in curbs and eventual cutbacks in their costly, deadly strategic arsenals. Our posture has been dictated instead by a view that the negotiations are but another way to continue the competition, to jockey for advantage.

It came home to me in a recent discussion with a nuclear arms specialist from the Pentagon. I ventured the assertion that SALT had been almost wholly a bust—that nothing had been sacrificed that otherwise would have been built; that, at home, the process had only added another justification—the “bargaining chip”—for building every new weapon that comes down the pike, off the drawing board, whether we need it or not. I suggested further that the whole process can only be discredited by agreements that leave gaping loopholes—loopholes that are designed to suit Pentagon plans now, but which will open suspicions that the Russians are cheating later on (how would Kissinger prove to Senator Jackson or Admiral Zumwalt five years from now that the Russians are not deploying cruise missiles with a 3,000-mile range?).

I was told rather impatiently that these observations amounted to a simple-minded misunderstanding of the very reasons why we talk: “The purpose of these discussions is not to cut our defense budget. The best SALT agreement would be one in which we were allowed to build everything we wanted, and the Russians were required to give up everything they had.”

So that has been our controlling doctrine. No mutual interest is involved. The negotiating table is nothing more than another cold-war battlefield. That is the way SALT has been played. And that is why SALT is about played out.

On balance, then, the SALT II agreement deserves neither opposition nor support. If we are serious about controlling weapons, then it mostly deserves to be dismissed as unimportant. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger should be told to defend their performance themselves.

That means arms controllers must think about, and

responsible candidates must address, a posture which goes well beyond a general sympathy for SALT negotiations. It could be something like this:

For the present, *de jure* limits would be de-emphasized, and we would concentrate on holding unilaterally to a nuclear position that is truly limited to national security needs.

It should excise the exotic counterforce and limited nuclear war doctrines developed under Secretary Schlesinger, and should concentrate instead on the single sane and achievable mission of nuclear weapons—to deter war—by maintaining the forces needed to convince any adversary that we can answer any first strike with a society-destroying blow in return.

It should drop spurious references to “superiority” and even “parity.” Those terms have no military meaning in a realm where each side can totally destroy the other with only a fraction of its forces. They have political meaning only to the extent that we say they do. The theory is that third countries will be inclined toward the Soviet Union, or our allies will feel less secure, if the Russians can destroy us, say, sixty times over, and we can destroy them but forty. Every country in the world can muster more sense than that.

Our position should freeze the deployment and flight testing of all new weapons. With the redundant insurance already in force, we would have far more than an ample deterrent if additional weapons and new systems were stopped right now. In 1967 then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara quantified an adequate deterrent as the assured ability to land 400 one-megaton equivalents on separate Soviet targets. Our MIRV warheads are considerably smaller than one megaton. But, essentially because explosions are spherical and targets are flat, smaller warheads are more efficient. Increases in numbers more than make up for reductions in size. At nearly 9,000 warheads now, almost anyone should agree that we are some distance beyond a borderline case.

The responsibility for further arms race initiatives should be placed on the Soviet Union. We should make a clear declaration of intent: that instead of unilaterally running ahead in the competition, we are unilaterally calling a halt; that we are continuing reasonable research and development programs on a wholly defensive basis, to guard against technical breakthroughs which might threaten us; that we do not intend to add anything more until or unless the Soviet Union moves to undermine our deterrent; that we will welcome and are watching for reciprocal steps.

There is no guaranteeing that this attempt at *de facto* arms control would produce such results. Perhaps the Politburo, too, is peopled by Strangeloves who exult in the game. But there is precedent for such an approach. The 1962 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty flowed from President Eisenhower's unilateral suspension of tests, and President Kennedy's patient maintenance of the same approach. And most Kremlinologists recognize that there are also hawks and doves in Soviet ruling circles. The old approach has strengthened the hawks. Why not play to the doves for a time?

Finally, in this context there is an especially poignant application of the standard argument for anything new—

it's bound to be better than what we have now.

Arms control should be a liberal issue in 1976. Most polls show widespread impatience with overkill and Pentagon waste. Arms spending boosts inflation and distorts the economy. Nuclear weapons are still the quickest way going, assorted environmental threats notwithstanding, to make the planet uninhabitable; the electorate has a right

to know in some detail what kind of thinking guides aspiring hands on the trigger.

But now it is not enough for candidates to tell us how they will negotiate with the Russians. They must first tell us where, how and how often they'll say "no" to the generals and admirals—in the arena here at home where the real arms-control battles are fought. □

STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT

BRITAIN'S SMALL DEAL

RAYMOND WILLIAMS

London

On February 20 the Wilson administration announced what appeared to be the most severe cuts in public expenditure in Britain for a generation. A serious right-wing newspaper welcomed the cuts as signaling the end of social democracy. A left-wing Labour ex-minister described them as "kicking the Welfare State in the teeth." Given this range of comment, one could be forgiven for thinking that something historic has happened. On the ground, as usual, it is more difficult to say.

The strategy of the cuts is indeed quite plain, but it is not new. It was announced, in very general terms, last October. The cuts are not primarily a response to the current depression, in which unemployment is running at between 5 and 6 per cent and industrial production is at a level below that of the three-day week imposed by the Heath administration during the 1974 confrontation with the miners. The current annual rate of inflation, now down from its peak of 26 per cent to around 18 per cent, and expected to continue to fall, has already reduced living standards and produced some interim economies in public expenditure. An agreement between the government and the unions, made last August, has restricted wage rises during the current twelve months to a flat-rate £6 a week, and allows no increases at all in annual salaries above £8,500. Average rises in earnings, which were running ahead of rises in prices until late in 1975, have now fallen behind them and will go on falling further behind. What is now being played out, as a short-term policy, is an attempt to get a further period of wage restraint, to be compensated by cuts in direct taxation and marginal measures to decrease unemployment. In a very tight political situation, with its overall parliamentary majority already effectively lost, the government is struggling to maintain its alliance with the unions by postponing many of the major effects of its long-term strategy. Thus actual public expenditure for the fiscal years 1975-76 and 1976-77 is certain to exceed its former estimates by £1,600 million and £500 million respectively. The severe cuts now announced are for the period 1977-79,

and this fact alone goes some way to explain the relative moderation of the response to them. It is at this point that a distinction between the short-term balancing act, to maintain the alliance with the unions, and the medium and long-term strategy is crucial. In the immediate political wheeling and dealing the short-term policy predominates; the rest is merely working its way through.

When the cuts for 1977-79 are examined in detail it is clear that the intention is to create a new kind of economy. The most severe cuts are in education, with higher education and nursery schooling hit especially hard, but with sufficiently severe general reductions to put 20 per cent of the existing number of teachers out of work. There is some fall in the birth rate to set against this, but it has also to be set beside an increase in job-training facilities outside the educational system. The dominant policy in education is thus to reduce its general content and to increase industrial training. There is then a series of cuts designed to increase the cost of living of the active working class: severe reductions of subsidies to utilities, public transport, municipal housing and food. At the same time, welfare benefits will be relatively sustained and so will the health service. Thus the underlying social model takes shape. The active working class will be put squarely back into the market, with the substantial social wage of a previous generation radically reduced. But this will also be a smaller working class, and public expenditure will be concentrated on the old, the sick and a relatively large number of unemployed. It is the model which the Right has been recommending, and trying to put into practice, since the 1950s.

Meanwhile, the purpose of the overall reduction in public expenditure is to relieve demand on the capital market in the period after the current depression. A huge residual public debt will in any case have to be financed, and over the period taxation will rise slightly. But the strategy depends on major increases in industrial investment, both directly by the government and in the capital market where public borrowing is now predominant. Since the rate of industrial investment has been extraordinarily low, since the 1950s, there are compelling reasons for this kind of priority. The economic model falls into place beside the social model: the return of utilities and transport to the market; significant increases in in-

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vestment and profitability in productive industry; a reduction in the rate of transfer from manufacturing to services.

It is evident that this is a rational model. Indeed it is easy to understand the government's impatience with its critics, who are for the most part reduced to saying that this or that is a bad thing. In this sense it is indeed the ruling group in the Labour Party which has taken the full measure of the economic crisis. But what this group does not understand at all, though it is well understood to their right, is the social and political crisis of which this is a part. The whole postwar deal, which led to the definitions of modern social democracy and the welfare state, is, at this planning stage, being profoundly modified. The most significant factor is the implicit abandonment of full employment as a policy. Every major industry is now, in public relations language, being slimmed, with significant planned losses of jobs. You have only to add these up to know that what lies ahead is structural unemployment, as distinct from the unemployment of depression, and at a much higher level than has been thought tolerable since the 1930s. The political consequences are then considerable.


The most likely consequence, of course, is that the Labour government, drawing on its reserves of goodwill in the unions, will get the country through the immediately difficult transitional years, but will in the process alienate enough of the working class and poor to create the basis for a Conservative government to take over on the upswing, with all the crucial battles about the social wage and full employment already determined. It is never pleasant to watch a political tendency committing suicide, but that is what is happening in the group that still likes to think of itself as social democratic. It whistles encouragement to itself to the tune of its persistent alliance with the leadership of the unions. We haven't, since the 1950s, seen so close an alliance between union leaderships and a right-wing Labour leadership. Perhaps they think this will see them through, beyond the hardships of the transition, but even if it does, the political effects will be much the same: the crucial priorities reversed, and a return to the proposition that, given the right conditions, capitalism will save us.

It is a pathetic illusion, in the circumstances. Even social democracy, in its postwar heyday, had to recognize two truths: first, that the organized working class will not limit itself to the share of the product and of the available employment that a rational and profitable capitalist industry, in a structurally weak national economy, can give it; second, that the capital market, without radical public intervention, moves toward profit, not only as between social need and the market but as between one sector of investment and another. In an economy starved of investment, significant amounts are invested outside the country and in commercial and property development; manufacturing gets what is left. There are absolutely no guarantees that this process will not continue, and meanwhile even the cheap support services of the nationalized industries, which have kept a weak manufacturing industry going, are being returned to the market, raising primary costs. The most likely result is a further significant penetration of the economy by the much more strongly based international companies.

Moreover what has not been allowed for, in this medium-term planning, is the political and trade-union response as the real effects work through from their present status on paper to actual social and economic results. At the moment the Left is weak, with the unions understandably frightened by unemployment and by the glimpse of hyperinflation last summer, and with most of the political groups hanging on to a belief that an undivided Labour Party will keep a Labour government in office. But several factors are at work. There has been a break to the Left in the formation of an independent Scottish Labour Party, following the rising nationalist movement there. The pressure for political devolution to Scotland and Wales will not weaken but strengthen the Left as a whole, but it will certainly weaken the precarious structure of the Labour Party, which has never had a majority in England alone.

Meanwhile, the coming of direct elections to the EEC Parliament, in 1978, at a time when significant openings to the Left and new Socialist-Communist alliances are taking shape in Italy and in France, will begin to create conditions for a realistic political alternative among the many Socialists now trapped in the Labour Party. If this takes place, as seems likely, at a time when the full effects of these cuts are working through, and when a reviving capitalism is insisting on a structural unemployment, the whole political scene could change. Either a residual Labour government or a relatively weak Conservative government, enmeshed in or limited by alliance with minority parties, would have to face challenges of a kind that have not been faced since the 1920s, as a political alternative combines with social and industrial militancy.

This is then the alternative medium-term planning for Socialists. The biggest obstacle to it, ironically, is not the residual loyalty to the Labour Party, based on the repeatedly exploded illusion that it will get its parliamentary majority and begin to inaugurate socialism. The cuts will at least reduce that, though some will try to turn to a scenario for the 1980s that repeats the 1960s and 1970s but with magically opposite effects. The most serious obstacle, is the Left's opposi-



Emmwood, London Daily Mail

The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Streaker.

tion to a West European socialist strategy, an opposition now mainly determined by the Communist Party's reflection of Soviet foreign policy opposition to the EEC. Much of the English Left is simultaneously opposed to the nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales. But if the pressures are what these cuts foreshadow, from the

social and economic models now so openly proposed it is improbable that the present frozen political structures can survive them. And if Socialists are not ready, it is clear from the rationality of this new medium-term program that there will be plenty of others, on the Right, who are. □

JUDICIAL MENDICANTS

THE JUDGES WANT A RAISE

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, Jr.

Forty-four federal judges are officially demanding a salary increase. These are the judges who have joined in bringing a suit which contends that, contrary to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, their "compensation [has been] diminished during their Continuance in Office." In economic terms, their contention has unarguable merit, for what their salaries will buy today is a lot less than what those same salaries bought five years ago.

On legal grounds, the argument doesn't seem very strong. For one thing, the constitutional provision seems to have aimed at retaliatory salary reductions and not mere insensitivity to the needs of the judiciary. There is no evidence of such a retaliatory purpose. For another, the grievance concerns the value of the dollar, and Congress has the power to "coin Money, and regulate the value thereof." For still another, if the judges' position were sustained, a somewhat parallel argument could be made in behalf of the President and other members of the executive branch. True, there is no express guaranty against diminution of salary of officials other than judges but Congressional attempts to cut off the salaries of executive officials have been held to run afoul of the Constitution. Hence, if devaluation is diminution for judges, it conceivably could be held a bill of attainder for non-judges. And if the decision were not generalized in this way, it would result in giving the judiciary, among all government employees, a preferred position of insulation from the effects of inflation. The judges called on to decide the case will very likely hesitate a long time before conferring that benefit on themselves.

It is inconceivable that the judges who have sued are unaware that their suit is dubious. One must conclude, therefore, that their aim is political, to bring their cause to public notice in a dramatic way. It is a mark of our times that federal judges should find themselves among those using the courts as a forum for political demonstration. But although they have succeeded in making the matter a subject of public debate, doing so may not aid in producing the results they want.

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Congress knows that judicial salaries have suffered serious erosion; that a number of able judges have resigned for this reason; that a much larger number are suffering severe hardship to themselves and to their families by trying to stay on the bench; that judges as a class are suffering perhaps more than other classes of government employees because they are mostly in an age group whose family responsibilities are heaviest (having, for example, teenage children with college expectations); that the freeze on salaries has made it increasingly harder to recruit judges to the federal bench; that the alternative of resigning means abandoning a goal of professional fulfillment which for many judges has been their highest personal aim.

Congress also knows that salaries are not simply compensation but a mark of status; that a federal judge's status is an important element of his authority; and that the federal judiciary feels that the indifference to its compensation signifies an indifference to sustaining the authority of the federal courts.

If Congress knows all this, why doesn't it act? Surely the answer is not simple indifference. But if it is studied indifference, what comprises the study?

A number of possibilities come to mind. One is that Congress is indeed quietly retaliating for what it regards as judicial abuse of office. The conservatives grumble at the law made by the Warren Court; the liberals grumble that the Burger Court isn't making more of it. That feeling by the conservatives neutralizes their natural sympathy for the income expectations of a professional class with whom they would otherwise identify; that feeling by the liberals reinforces their natural proclivity for leveling out income distribution.

Another explanation is that Congress is joining the rest of the population in expressing dissatisfaction with government, at least the non-Congressional part of it. The judiciary has been hurt by the salary freeze, but the upper echelons of the agencies and departments have been hurt even worse—because those jobs are less secure and prestigious but often even more demanding than federal judgeships. The public's being "turned off" by government bureaus in general is thus given expression by Congress's turning off the money to pay bureaucrats in general. The judges are simply suffering along with the rest of the higher civil service.

But the problem can be viewed as not limited to the



Graham, Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock)

"—If It Please the Court. . ."

federal judiciary or to the present discontent with government. Rather, the case of the judges' salaries is a special and relatively visible instance of a problem of much greater depth and much longer duration.

The salaries that the federal government pays judges and other high civil servants are at least twice and probably nearer three times what the average American family earns. State governments and a few local agencies pay even larger salaries to some higher civil servants, including professionals in medicine, law and higher education. The average citizen, especially in a time of economic distress, resents the differential. A recent incident both demonstrates this feeling and illustrates how oblivious of it a sheltered higher civil servant can become. A federal judge eager to get his salary problem across to the general public went on a television "talk show" to be interviewed about it. From the moment that he mentioned what his salary actually was (\$42,000 per year), the station switchboard was flooded by calls from people filled with scorn and indignation, many of whom offered to take over a job that had such good pay and working conditions. The high level-bureaucrats, the military brass, the faculty of public universities, would all have aroused the same reaction, and often have aroused it in the legislature. Gov. "Jerry" Brown has made not a little hay by catering to it.

Although the salaries of these officials are high by comparison with the average American's income, they are not high in relation to those paid comparable functionaries in the private sector. Indeed, by that standard they are modest, even allowing for the relative security and prestige of many public offices. Highly competent professionals in private practice command compensation at

or approaching the six-figure level. The same is true of upper echelon managers in private industry. When allowance is made for the value of autonomy and the rewards of consultantship, the same is true of top academics at leading private and quasi-public universities. Furthermore, salary *differentials* (which express status differentials) are much greater in the private sector than in public service. With the "grade inflation" at the bottom of the civil service, and the salary freeze at the top, the top-level civil servant finds himself making only a little more than twice as much as a middling office operative, whereas his private counterpart enjoys a ratio twice that or more. The compression at the very top is even worse. Officials with responsibility for huge bureaucratic domains are paid a very little bit more than subordinate office managers who suffer only a fraction of the heat and headaches.

Until recently various stratagems were used to avoid this difficulty in the public service. The salary schedules were not widely publicized; fringes, especially retirement benefits, were made generous; recommendations for upward adjustment of high-level salaries were made by consultants who were themselves drawn from upper echelons of the private sector, and allowed to take effect by *sub silentio* legislative approval. The federal government partly solved the problem by contracting out certain types of work that required high-level professionalism; Rand and the Institute for Defense Analysis became permanent conduits for doing so. But these arrangements too have come under attack, nominally because they involve evasion of civil service salary schedules, but more fundamentally because they have permitted compensation levels that were politically obnoxious.

In an earlier day such devices were probably not necessary. Although I am not familiar with documentation of the point, there is reason to think that the higher-level civil servants of yesteryear enjoyed, more often than now, what is gently known as an independent income. The salary of an office was sustenance, not a livelihood. And recruitment to high public office was more rigidly limited to those who were "the better sort" in an economic sense.

But if the inheritances no longer exist, and the salary stratagems can no longer be employed, how can the country get and keep competent civil servants, given the competition of the private marketplace? One way is to change the recruiting methods. This approach is pertinent if not dispositive to the case of the federal judiciary, though no consolation to incumbents. The fact is that the federal judiciary has been disproportionately recruited from the ranks of highly successful lawyers in private practice. On the whole, I think this has been desirable, but many do not agree with me. However that may be, it means that selection is made from among those for whom the income differential between private and public service will be largest, and it is not the only possible policy. If recruiting were more intensively directed to persons already in the public service—state court judges, public prosecutors and defenders, agency attorneys—the results would undoubtedly be better. And the same would go for recruitment to departments other than the judiciary.

It is doubtful, however, that this would do much more than shift the problem. For the question of the quality of high-level managerial and professional personnel is, on the whole, at least as serious in state and local government as it is in the federal government. This is so because the disparity of compensation levels is even more visible, and the subject of even more intense public feeling, the deeper one goes into the grass roots.

Moreover, the political pressure against high salaries for high-level servants does not emanate from the working class alone. Most professionals and middle managers in the private sector have achieved for themselves compensation levels that are not much better than those obtaining in the public service. This reflects the fact that the range of performance of professionals and managers, as measured by the marketplace, is very wide, and the distribution of income among them far from democratic. But the distribution of sentiment is still one man, one ego. And that is what translates into public opinion. For every professional who thinks public salary levels need to be raised to approximate private levels, there are two or three who think, judged by their own situation, that the levels are already comparable.

All the while, and for the foreseeable future, govern-

ment is taking on larger and more complex entrepreneurial functions. It already spends more than a third of the national income. It operates much of the transportation system, most of the educational system and all of the defense system. It runs multibillion-dollar insurance schemes, research programs and recreational services. It manages hospitals, law departments, engineering offices and accounting services. It owns and operates enormous real estate holdings.

The present government personnel policy derives from a reform originally designed to take post office clerkships out of politics. The question is whether that policy is compatible with the requirements for professional and managerial competence posed by the new socialism. Does that policy make it possible for an elective democracy to have a real meritocracy in its employ? Maybe it does, if reliance can still be placed on altruism and the attractions of public service as a substitute for bread. On the other hand, the nonmonetary attractions of public service seem to be on the decline, and altruism has always been in short supply. And we should be wary of creating a situation where other compensations make their appearance. One of them is money under the table; another is the opportunity to exercise power for its own sake. □

Greece: Obsessed With the Junta

JAMES WILLIAM BROWN

Greece is a country that commits suicide—a fact appreciated in the foreign ministries of other countries genuinely interested in Greek affairs and usually ready to provide the knife.

—Kevin Andrews

Athens

On the stage, a middle-aged couple has just returned home from a dinner party where the other guests boasted of their acts of personal resistance to the military regime that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. The wife says, "Only we, we said nothing. What did we do? Think of one little thing we did, one little thing" There is a pause while they stare at each other. "You cut your hair!," she shrieks at him. "You kept paying taxes!"

"Is it my fault that I'm still alive?," the husband asks. The Athenian audience laughs at this scene from Costas Mourselas's series of sketches, *National Comedy*, but the laughter is self-conscious. The couple recalls that "some did throw stones at the tanks." And finally they move forward into the audience to confess their individual failures.

Allocation of guilt is a major preoccupation in post-junta Greece, but blaming too often replaces soul-searching; present issues and problems are being overlooked in the fascination with the recent past. In an

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attempt to give Greeks a much-needed feeling of catharsis, the Karamanlis government put the entire era of the dictatorship on trial. The events of the seven junta years (for which Greeks have coined the word *eptaetia* from the word for the number seven) have been exposed and examined in trial after trial, but catharsis still seems as far away as ever.

The haste with which the government commuted the death sentences of the big three—Papadopoulos, Makarezos and Pattakos—at the end of the first trial met with considerable public protests; even by those who usually oppose the death penalty. Had a deal been made? Was the CIA ransoming its lackeys? According to newspaper polls, most Greeks were convinced that execution was the only just punishment for those who overthrew the legal government and abolished democratic procedures. One suggestion was that the condemned should have been provided with bus fare from prison, set free without bodyguards and left to make their own way home through the crowds.

The most alarming of all the trials was that of the torturers of ESA—the dreaded military police. "We turned into robots of sadism," declared ex-ESA man Kambunas in his tearful court apology. Parliamentarian Virginia Tsouderou testified that there was proof of use of a NATO-sponsored manual which prescribes step-by-step methods of torture to elicit information.

Greek conservatives were confused by much of this. It was, they felt, only natural that the junta should

have persecuted the Left. But then they saw that army officers, conservatives like themselves, had tortured other army officers. Colonel Moustaklis, one of the junta's most dramatic accusers (mute and paralyzed from torture) was a conservative officer who had fought against the Communists in the Greek civil war.

Next came the trial of those responsible for deaths and injuries among the workers and students who had protested at the Athens Polytechnic in November 1973. The heaviest sentence went to former junta strong man Ioannides. He received life imprisonment for responsibility for the murder of at least thirty-four persons and injuries to more than 2,000. Witnesses testified that police emptied their service revolvers into the heads of unarmed students and then bragged to fellow officers.

The last of the major trials has only just begun. It will examine those involved in the junta-organized coup against Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Greeks hope that this trial will provide a definitive account of the extent of U.S. involvement in that coup and in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus that followed. Few here doubt that the United States was involved and theories as to how are without number.

Other minor trials will take place throughout the spring and summer. The Supreme Court, however, has exonerated civilians who accepted governmental posts during the dictatorship. George Marvos, leader of the opposition Center Union-New Forces Party protested that the decision "runs counter to public feelings." A government spokesman responded, "If we persecuted all those who held governmental posts or worked for the government during the dictatorship, then half of all Greeks should stand trial. Greece would turn into a huge court for a whole generation."

Some seem to want this. Lady Amalia Fleming, widow of the discoverer of penicillin and herself a victim of the junta says that the trials and punishments have been "better than nothing, but not enough." She believes that only the top people are being brought to trial. Minor police and army officers are escaping punishment and for the most part have kept the positions they held under the junta. But as long as there is a threat of war with Turkey, the government is reluctant to pursue more purges of the military.

Trials and purges are only the visible part of the search for catharsis. There is also a sense of personal guilt, especially among Greeks who neither supported nor opposed the regime. They are the moderate 50 per cent of the country. They have been described by David Holden, foreign correspondent of *The Sunday Times* (of London), as a passive mass that went along "in tolerable ease of mind and body and because they saw no immediate alternative anyway."

Many of these people today have feelings that nibble away at that most sensitive of Greek attributes: *philotimo*—the sense of personal honor. Novelist Kazantzakis described the modern Greek as "a pathological individualist; he fawns upon his superiors like a Byzantine and torments his inferiors like an Aga, yet

he will die for his *philotimo* . . ."

This fawning-tormenting characteristic can be seen in the actions of the officials of Nea Smyrni, a middle-class suburb of Athens. It was to the cemetery there that then-dictator Papadopoulos wanted to transfer the bodies of his parents from their village cemetery. He offered to buy burial plots in the cemetery, but the town officials insisted on making him a gift of the plots. Appropriate noises were heard as to how Papadopoulos was honoring Nea Smyrni by his actions, and so his parents' coffins were moved and reburied. After the junta's fall and Papadopoulos's arrest, the local officials demanded that the bodies be removed at once. They threatened court action, which was a little redundant since Papadopoulos was already in court facing a charge of high treason.

Of course, cunning is as much a part of the Greek heritage as the Parthenon. In the traditional Greek shadow theatre plays, Karaghiozis, the braggart hero, pits his wit, craftiness and boasting against the ruling Turks whom he despises, yet under whom he must exist.

Under the junta, one was forced to choose between shame and fear, writes Kay Cicellis, a Greek writer who remained in Greece during those years but published abroad anonymously. Shame—if one conformed to what was requested: "to send one's child to a propaganda rally; to make a 'voluntary' subscription to a public loan; to cooperate in a state project." Fear—if one refused to conform: "The well-known ring at the door at dawn which one knows is not the milkman. . . ." The pendulum swung between shame and fear "and in the middle, hatred. Hatred of those responsible for this state of affairs, which sometimes helps to cover shame. . . ."

To most Greeks today, "those responsible" means the United States. One would have to search hard to find a Greek here who does not hold the Americans (and specifically the CIA) responsible for nearly everything wrong in Greece from the coup of April 21, 1967 up through the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Much of this feeling is justified. It can no longer be doubted that the regime which systematically brutalized Greek society for seven long years could not have lasted without the massive financial and military support from Washington.

"The United States was solicitous of the Greek junta," said Sen. Thomas Eagleton at a press conference in Athens last August. "We gave support. We helped keep it in power. If I were a citizen of Greece and had seen U.S. Embassy officials being obsequious to Papadopoulos and the others, I, too, would feel negative toward the United States."

But some of the negative feelings toward the United States come from those who, now that it's all over, still wish for a tank to throw stones at. Among the pre-coup politicians, there is a refusal to accept any responsibility for the prolonged period of crisis and confusion that preceded and helped prepare the way for the coup. Author Chariton Korizes has written, "Indeed the fact that the regime found it so easy to recruit people to man its machinery of terror and torture is not unconnected with the way democracy was functioning in pre-coup Greece."

There seems to be a fear here that recognition of the mistakes of politicians who ran the country before the coup (many of whom sit in the Greek parliament again today) might imply approval for the repressive measures of the military regime.

The mistakes of U.S.-Greek policy are far more visible than are those of elderly politicians. They serve as easy targets for the anger that was repressed under the authoritarianism of the junta. The murder of CIA head Richard Welch was one result of that anger.

"Of course no one wants to believe it was done by a Greek," a university student told a magazine reporter here. The most common theory is that it was the work of foreign terrorists. But it is also true that, "those who suffered under the junta feel that this murder was just." The White House theory that the exposure of Welch's name in the press was "tantamount to an assassination" is unreasonable. It was common knowledge in certain circles in Athens that for the past twenty years the head of the CIA has always lived in the same villa. Anyone who wished to know the name of the current one had only to ask the neighbors.

The most recent uproar occurred after publication of an Associated Press article on anti-Americanism in Greek newspapers. It is true that some Athenian papers have been almost apoplectic in their attacks on U.S. policy. Even the Greek Government has referred to the Greek press as "the yellowest in the world." After the AP article, one afternoon daily referred to the "hysterical and vulgar polemic of American newspapers." Another, referring to the charge that two Greek dailies are financed by Communist sources abroad, accused Americans of creating "imaginary scapegoats in order to cover up their crimes and errors."

The anti-American hostility has embarrassed the Karamanlis government, which fears that Congress may cut down President Ford's proposed \$225 million aid package for Greece. Greece also does not want to frighten away any of the American companies which are transferring here from Lebanon. The investment these companies could bring Greece might help shorten the prescribed preparatory period leading to full EEC membership.

The problems of EEC entry are among the matters being overlooked in the search for catharsis, according to editor and publisher Eleni Vlachos. "Too many Greeks think of the EEC as a kind of Santa Claus from whose bag we can take countless treasures without having to contribute much."

And there are the problems with Turkey: little progress has been made toward a settlement in Cyprus. Prime Minister Karamanlis did not even refer to Cyprus in his New Year message, which listed the achievements of the past year. President Tsatsos asked Greeks "to support our suffering brothers on Cyprus in their struggle . . .," but suggested vaguely that they accomplish this by doing what they can at all levels.

Turkey and Greece are also still squabbling about rights to the oil that has been discovered beneath the Aegean and rights to the air routes above it.

Another cause for unrest is the continuing presence of junta ministers in Karamanlis's Cabinet, a situation that has drawn criticism from the opposition and from conservatives alike. The present Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bitsios, was spokesman for the junta at the United Nations during the years of the dictatorship. The Minister of Defense and the Minister of Public Order also served in responsible positions under the military regime.

The Balkan Conference came and went early this year, with little interest among the Greeks. It accomplished little but the government felt that it was important as an indication that the isolation of the junta years was over. But in spite of this, "The prevailing Greek mood has been strongly isolationist," says writer and translator Nikos Stangos. He feels that Greeks are still going through an identity crisis resulting from the seven years of dictatorship. They want "to collect their thoughts, to see how they can make sense out of the desolation in which they have found themselves." This notion is reflected also in a poem by Yannis Ritsos:

*If only we could be left, at long last,
To our venerable reverent grief, to our death,
To our pride in not cowering before
the shadows of things.*

□

ACADEMIC PRIME TIME

A Modest Proposal for Classrooms

PAUL BLUMBERG

Some years ago, John Kenneth Galbraith captured a central dilemma of American society with his "theory of social balance," according to which a reasonably civilized society must achieve a rough balance between the *private* consumption of goods and services and the provision of *public* goods and services. This reasonably civilized society

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has not done so. America today, especially the cities, is afflicted with a terrible imbalance between private affluence on the one hand and public poverty on the other. While much of the private sector basks, the public sector languishes almost as an underdeveloped backwash in an otherwise overdeveloped, overprivatized society.

Higher education in America is a conspicuous victim of this imbalance. Battered by inflation, recession and New York's financial woes, the City University of New York, having had its budget reduced \$87 million already this year, faces another \$55 million cut this spring, totalling

nearly 25 per cent of its budget. Thousands of instructors have been fired, teaching load and class size have increased, campus libraries are keeping bankers' hours, and plans have been made to scrap open enrollment, raise fees or charge tuition for the first time, close down entire colleges and—an innovation—"furlough" (i.e. lock out) professors for four weeks during the spring term. Similar, if less dramatic, financial problems confront colleges and universities, public as well as independent, throughout the nation. Moreover, the era of endless increases in enrollment has come to an end, forcing many smaller independent institutions to the wall and occasionally leading college officials, at unseemly recruitment bazaars, to court and entice potential students like men gathered round an attractive woman at a Madison Avenue bar.


The question, then, for higher education, as well as for the public sector as a whole, is how best to transfer funds from the private to the public sector in order to establish some civilized social balance. The solution for the entire public sector is obviously very complex, but to alleviate the specific financial problems of higher education is easily accomplished. We must simply allow commercial sponsorship in the college classroom. The mind at first resists this notion as incompatible with academic values, but we must dismiss the idea that the university is a privileged sanctuary, entitled to immunity from the other forces at loose in society.

If the entire society has been commercialized, then why not the university itself, especially when it could have such practical benefits? If ex-Vice Presidential candidates can do commercials, if actors, authors and astronauts not to mention athletes, can hustle for Madison Avenue, then why not professors?

Last summer, during Channel 13's auction week, New York's "noncommercial" television channel abandoned itself to an orgy of commercialism; WNET became probably the most commercial station in the history of television, with nonstop commercials for products and services that made the other commercial stations in town seem, by contrast, devoted wholly to the public interest. Following the lead of the noncommercial TV station, commercial sponsorship of college courses represents an ideal mode of funneling money from the private sector into higher education.

Concretely, the system might work as follows. Each college course would be sponsored by one or more commercial advertisers. Lectures, typically fifty minutes long, would be interrupted, much as on TV, four or five times for a message from the sponsor, delivered by the professor. Naturally, the professor need not endorse the product he's selling, but if he were offered a small piece of the action to supplement his inflation-flattened salary, we might, after a little embarrassed reluctance, see quite a flurry of professorial testimonials. Once the system really gets going, we might consider commercial dramatizations, done either by the students themselves or by traveling troupes of actors circulating from class to class during the academic day.

This arrangement should gratify the advertisers. First, they would have a captive audience, a promoter's dream. Second, the demographics of that audience—as they say in



Janice Stapleton

the trade—are perfect: young, college-educated, intelligent, bound, or so they hope, for the upper-middle-class business and professional world. In brief, potentially big spenders. Third, for a substantial surcharge, instructors could incorporate questions about the commercials into the course examinations, thus providing a really foolproof incentive for student attention during the sponsor breaks. This would solve advertising's sticky problem with the public's unfortunate habit of tuning out commercial messages. Sample question: "Compare and contrast the beneficial uses of Geritol among the elderly, the middle-aged, and young adults of college age."

Of course, the proportion of any exam devoted to commercials should be regulated carefully; things mustn't be allowed to get out of hand. No more than, say, 10 per cent of any exam should be given over to questions on the commercials. We might possibly go to 15 per cent if the university budget really gets tight.

Advertising rates for each commercial would depend, naturally, on the number of students in each class; moreover, something akin to TV's prime time could be formulated, with rates accordingly higher. Of his years at the University of Minnesota, Max Shulman recalled that he planned his college education very carefully: no classes before 10 A.M. and nothing after 2 P.M. Assuming that students are most attentive during these hours, sleeper before 10 and after 2, prime-time differentials for this time slot seem eminently reasonable.

As for products where enticement might be displayed in the classroom, here again a whole world opens up. We have, first, in addition to all those goods advertised for the general public, articles and services appropriate for students in particular. Natural would be ads for miscel-

laneous school supplies and accessories that every scholar needs—various Bic bananas, stationery, typewriters, briefcases and the like. Promoters could tap the youth market directly, with ads for clothing, records, books, films, theatres, resorts and local places of entertainment. College newspapers these days are regularly accepting ads for contraceptives, and commercials for these would spice up any lecture, however tedious. Employment agencies might offer optimistic messages to graduating seniors who are beginning to wonder whether they will, after all, be able to find work in their chosen field with a degree in philosophy or medieval history.

In addition to these commercials with a general appeal to the entire student body, advertisers could tailor specific products for specific courses. In a psychology course, for example, the professor might announce that, "We will return to Freud's theory of dreams after a brief word from

Sominex." And what better place to peddle pocket calculators than in the math department? For foreign language and literature courses, the national airline of that country becomes a natural sponsor. Olympic Airways, for example, would happily sponsor a course in Greek but, of course, no dancing in the aisles (in the classroom or on the airplane), and what are you doing here when you could be there? Likewise for courses in French, German, Italian, Spanish, Hebrew, and so on.

In short, the possibilities are endless and mutually beneficial. This innovative program would assist corporations by offering them another opportunity to sink their roots still deeper into American society, and it would assist higher education by providing a generous and untapped source of funds to alleviate deepening financial crises. Professor Galbraith's "theory of social balance" would at last find practical application. □

A MESSAGE TO CASTRO

CUBA AND THE PLO

MAURICE ZEITLIN

Last summer Mayor Paul Soglin of Madison, Wis., visited Cuba and met with Fidel Castro. On December 29 Soglin and his wife, Dianne, returned to Cuba for a five-day vacation. He delivered Maurice Zeitlin's letter to Fidel through officials of the Foreign Ministry, and understands that a reply will be forthcoming soon. Zeitlin, professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, is the author (with Robert Scheer) of Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere, and Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class. In 1962, he was a Nation correspondent in Cuba and that year wrote for the magazine "Labor in Cuba" (October 20) and "Castro and Cuba's Communists" (November 3).

Estimado Companero Fidel:

I send you this letter through the good offices of the mayor of my city, and my friend, Paul Soglin. I met you only for a moment thirteen years ago in Havana, so if you recognize my name it will be because I have written two books and many articles reporting on the essence and achievements of the Cuban revolution. Perhaps also, Che may have mentioned our own long and intense, sometimes heated, always honest conversations in 1961 and 1962, when I was doing my research on Cuban workers.

This letter is to record my opposition to your government's policies in the Middle East. I write it because I am confident that you will listen to the questions I pose here—questions that you must not ignore if you are to retain the respect and admiration of genuine revolutionaries for whom the fate of the Jewish people is not a mere plaything of cynical international politics.

In 1967, you were "shocked" by the "lack of revolutionary principles" betrayed by Arab propaganda preceding the Six Day War. "True revolutionaries," you said, "never threaten a whole country with extinction. We have spoken out clearly against Israel's policy, but we

don't deny her right to exist!" In 1967 your ambassador to the United Nations condemned "any political proclamation whose aim is the annihilation of any people or state. . . . This principle is equally applicable to the Palestinian people, unjustly and brutally dispossessed of its territory, and the Hebrew people who, for 2,000 years, have suffered under persecution and racial prejudice and—during the not-too-distant era of Nazism—suffered under one of the most cruel attempts at mass murder ever recorded."

Do you now deny that same "Hebrew people" its own national existence in Israel? In the shadow of the Holocaust which took 6 million of my people, do you ask me to abandon Israel? If the vast majority of the Jewish people identify with Israel as I do, it is not because they are "Zionists," but because they know, as Moshe Sneh, late Secretary General of the Communist Party of Israel said, that they are "alive only by chance. . . . Every Jew knows and feels that he was condemned to death only because of his Jewishness and that only by accident the death sentence wasn't carried out. Every Jew proudly bears in his heart the yellow patch with the Star of David that our brothers were forced to carry on their backs as a sign of disgrace. . . and as a shipping tag to the death camp." Do you not understand, then, as Sneh said, that "the comparison of Zionism with racialism and Nazism are insults to every Jew as a Jew"?

Are you no longer shocked, do you no longer condemn random terror and indiscriminate killing of unarmed men, women and children? Do you know that three days after the U.N. resolution condemning Zionism as "a form of racism," a resolution which your government not merely endorsed but took the lead in advocating, the PLO blew up Jerusalem's Zion Square, killing seven teenagers and wounding and maiming dozens more? Do you know that the Palestine Corner, Radio Damascus, glorified these killings on November 10 and justified them by the U.N.

resolution? "The Fedayeen take one copy of the resolution adopted at the U.N., mix it with TNT and blow up Zion Square. . . . Now the resolutions. . . are turning into deeds." Are these the kind of "great deeds for the peace and progress of mankind" to which President Osvaldo Dorticos referred a year ago, in awarding Yassir Arafat the Playa Giron National Order? Are these acts part of Arafat's "exemplary record"?—and does this award to him not disgrace the dead at Playa Giron?

Does the Fatah call for "the destruction of a society" no longer move you to condemnation? Or have you, too, simply been misled by their public relations campaign? When you embraced Arafat in Havana a year ago did you know that Fatah still defined "liberation. . . [as] not only the removal of an armed imperialist base but, more important, . . . the destruction of a society. . . the destruction of the means of life of Zionist society in all their forms. . . The aim of the Palestine Liberation war is not only to inflict a military defeat but also to destroy the Zionist character of the occupied land, whether it is human or social" (pp. 16-17 in the Arabic pamphlet, *Tahrir Al Aktar al Muhtala Wauslub Alkifah Dhid Al Istiimar Almubashar*). Where is your advocacy of a resolution in the United

Nations condemning this as "a form of racism"?

Cuba has stood alone in the Communist world as an exemplar of the egalitarian and liberating vision of socialism. You consciously rejected the Soviet model of "how to construct Communism." You refused to allow others to define your national and revolutionary objectives, however dependent you were on them for assistance, if not survival. For this reason, as you said, Cuba was "the black sheep in the family." Cuba would not follow "the beaten path even if that path leads nowhere." One indication of your independent path was your refusal to subordinate Cuban to Soviet foreign policy. In the Middle East, in particular, you recognized, as I do, the aspirations and historic rights of two peoples—Arab and Jewish—for whom Palestine is a common home. You refused to break diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six Day War, though it would have been easy and expedient, when the USSR and other Communist countries did so.

In August 1973 you broke relations with Israel, and your government has now become a leading advocate of the PLO in the United Nations. How do you explain this? Have you now decided also to walk that beaten path that leads nowhere? □

CONGRESSIONAL JUNK MAIL

ABUSE OF A PRIVILEGE

REP. KEN HECHLER

Sometimes an idea is greeted with such vociferous apathy that you don't dare mention it again. When I told my fellow Congressmen that I was introducing a bill to abolish the Congressional franking privilege, established in 1775 by Postmaster General Benjamin Franklin, their reaction was less than enthusiastic, and it is accurate to report that there has been no increase in Congressional support. However, the letters I am receiving from the public convince me that this is a serious issue which deserves widespread discussion and debate.

Every freshman member of Congress is taken aside and told that there are three ways to get re-elected: use the frank, increase your use of the frank and bombard the public with franked mass mailings. In recent years, as the price of first-class postage has zoomed to 13¢, the use of the frank has not only increased postal costs but has also helped clog up the system with huge mass mailings at taxpayer expense.

In 1969, the cost of Congressionally franked mail topped \$10 million for the first time. Since then, it has been soaring even faster than the escalating price of a first-class postage stamp. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, the taxpayers shelled out \$34.5 million for franked mail, and the estimate is that in fiscal 1976 the toll will exceed \$46 million. All these sums are regularly

Ken Hechler, Democrat, represents the 4th District of West Virginia in the House of Representatives.

reimbursed to the Postal Service by Congressional appropriations out of general revenues—which is fancy book-keeping for the fact that the postage for franked mail comes out of the public's pockets.

When you review the records of the Postal Service, it is easy to see that not only does the volume of franked mail increase annually but also that there is always a strikingly large increase in an election year. In 1971, 239 million pieces of mail were franked; the figure shot up to 293 million in 1972, remained at 293 million in 1973, rose again to 315 million in 1974 and stabilized at 317 million in 1975. Needless to say, it won't be just the celebration of the Bicentennial that will cause Congressionally franked mail to spurt in 1976.

The biggest contributor to both the volume and cost of Congressionally franked mail is the "mass mailing"—of newsletters, questionnaires or franked brochures which, in the case of a Senator, go into every home in the state or, in the case of a Representative, into all households of a Congressional district. These missives are usually thinly veiled political documents designed to pump up the personal prestige of the Congressman and they really do help make the Congressman's name a family word. Included are carefully selected votes on a variety of issues, duly recorded in a fashion that appeals to local interest. There are photographs of the Congressman conferring with high government officials, greeting visitors from back home and engaged in activities of state which

impress constituents with a feeling that their Senator or Congressman is just about the most active, popular and at the same time down-to-earth official in Washington.

When the Post Office Department was a Cabinet office, before the independent Postal Service was established in 1970, use of the frank was policed rather loosely under supervision of the Postmaster General. Some blatantly political uses of the privilege were declared off-limits, and Congressmen who sent out mass mailings which went over the line were required to reimburse the Post Office Department for the cost of postage. But Congressmen found many clever ways to skin that cat, and in any case it was politically more advantageous to sound nonpolitical in a newsletter.

The new Postal Service declined to take on the policing responsibility, and it fell on the Congress to set up some regulations. For the past two years, the House of Representatives has had a "Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards," of which Rep. Morris K. Udall of Arizona is chairman. Guidelines for franked mail matter were enacted by the Congress, and the commission stipulated in more specific detail how these guidelines are to be applied. The commission also hears complaints, issues advisory opinions and may require reimbursement to the Treasury when it finds the guidelines violated.

Answering specific requests is clearly official business, but aside from that correspondence the line drawn between what is frankable and what is not gives Congressmen a wide latitude. For example, the guidelines or advisory opinions label the following as frankable: a letter to small businessmen advising them of a public meeting on small business matters; a press release on the attendance record of a Member of the House; a questionnaire soliciting opinion on the confirmation of Nelson A. Rockefeller as Vice President; a questionnaire asking for party preferences and a mass mailing to constituents urging voter registration. Held to be non-frankable are the following: holiday greetings, material containing photographs of family members or their activities, a newsletter expressing gratitude to constituents for election to Congress and a reprint from a national publication encouraging political support for incumbent Congressmen. Mass mailings are banned for twenty-eight days before a primary or general election, which prohibition places a particularly heavy burden on the mails in the days immediately preceding that brief period.

Questionnaires, I am told, are tremendous vote getters when mass-franked to the constituents. I have never mailed a questionnaire, but many of my constituents who have moved into my district recall with some awe that their former Congressman always asked their opinions on issues. Frequently, this has given them the warm feeling that "the Congressman really cares how I think, whether

or not he agrees with it"—and in the latter case the constituent feels he got something off his chest. I have often wondered why it takes a questionnaire to stimulate a constituent to express his feelings, but those who answer questionnaires obviously feel a sense of participation in the great democratic process. It is one of the best ways to get a Congressman's name into every home. The results, tabulated by computer, can also be the basis for targeting replies on specific issues.

For the first dozen or so years, while I was waging a campaign against "junk mail," I sent out no newsletters or questionnaires. After being redistricted in 1971 into a strange new area, I weakened and sent out three newsletters. The results were remarkable. There were a few angry comments, such as the return of envelopes unopened and marked "junk mail," but an overwhelming majority of people responded favorably to the listing of my voting record. It is clear that these newsletters gave me a tremendous advantage as an incumbent.

Another area allowed under the frankability guidelines which I find highly questionable is congratulations to high school graduates or the letter saying "I read something nice about you in the paper." Many Congressmen set their staff to clipping items on promotions, honors, awards, publications, etc., and then use the frank to write letters of congratulation. These letters are highly prized and long remembered, but they also give the incumbent an unfair advantage when he runs for re-election. Robotyped and mass-mailed congratulations to graduating seniors hardly seem the kind of "official business" that Benjamin Franklin had in mind when he helped establish the franking privilege as a way for Congressmen to communicate with their constituents on public issues.

I have introduced what I believe is the first bill to abolish the Congressional franking privilege. Mass mailings, questionnaires, congratulations to constituents and other nonofficial matters will be strictly prohibited. When a Congressman or a federal agency receives a specific request, my bill will allow the franked metering and postmarking of the response in such a way that the outgoing mail of either a Congressman or a federal agency can be closely monitored for volume. There is a small latitude for federal agencies to send out metered mailings that provide instructions on federal programs, but mass mailings by federal agencies which constitute puff pieces or plugs for particular individuals will be severely limited. Specifically prohibited will be such scandalous mailings as the one the Social Security Administration sent out to the tune of 26 million pieces in 1972, praising President Nixon and crediting him with a Social Security increase he had in fact opposed.

Common Cause filed suit in U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia in October 1973, challenging the constitutionality of the Congressional franking privilege on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The franking privilege inevitably favors incumbents over nonincumbents. If the suit is successful, perhaps my bill will ease the way toward ridding the economy of a high privilege that is so advantageous, highly popular and fiercely guarded by 534 members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Unicorns and Terrorists

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. Edited by Yonah Alexander. Foreword by Arthur J. Goldberg. Praeger Publishers. 393 pp. \$22.50.

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ

Social science presents a strange paradox. It projects pioneering theories and findings that make possible a deeper understanding of society. But more customarily, social science has a way of accommodating momentary conventions. A case in point is the subject of international terrorism. So commonplace has the phrase become, so much a part of journalistic discourse, that we have almost forgotten to inquire whether such an animal really exists. Our condition is not unlike that of the proverbial museum viewer and the unicorn: paintings of the unicorn hang in so many galleries that we begin to forget it is not actually part of nature but an artifact. I dare say international terrorism is similarly not part of social reality.

This is not to imply that there is no such thing as terrorism, or that terrorism is somehow confined to only one area of the world. Nor am I about to quibble about what constitutes terrorism. What I do assert is that there is no systematic evidence generally, and indeed little systematic or random evidence in the volume under consideration, that an international conspiracy for the use of force and the instillation of fear is intended to destroy organized society or the state mechanisms upon which the commonweal rests. The rash of writings concerning the subject of international terror must be carefully scrutinized, since such writings often contain important statements and findings on the generic subject of terrorism. But clearly, as an organizing premise at the global level, there is little to recommend that political unicorn at this time.

What we do have is terrorism as a national, regional and local activity. For the most part, as Bernard Johnpoll appropriately notes, terrorism tends to be parochial. For example, in the United States during the late 19th century, the Ku Klux Klan did struggle at local and

regional levels for the restoration of slavery, or if not that, for the continuation of black economic servitude. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Molly Maguires, the pseudonym given to some of the members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians in the mining regions, did engage in violence to insure better wages and conditions. But there is hardly any connection between the Klan and the Mollies. Similarly, toward the end of the century there were anarchist activities, but they had no relationship either geographically or economically to either of the other two groups, since they were primarily located in big cities, particularly Chicago. The desultory performances of contemporary groups like the Weathermen and the Symbionese Liberation Army, likewise indicate the isolated nature of terrorism within the United States, and testify to the absence of worldwide linkages. The same situation obtains with respect to Latin American terrorism. The Tupamaros of Uruguay and the Montoneros of Argentina have no links with each other or any other groups elsewhere in the hemisphere, much less the world. What is true of the United States and Latin America is just as much the case in other parts of the world: there are no *systematic* linkages of terrorist movements on an international basis.

This is not to deny that such linkages occasionally develop. Walter Laqueur remarks that Venezuelan activists sometimes operate in Western Europe on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, while in another instance an *opera buffa* called the Japanese "Red Army" was used by Arab extremists in an attack upon Lod Airport in Israel. But these are more in the neighborhood of paid mercenary activities than terrorist activities, involving as they do financial support from Libyan and Syrian political sources. What must be taken into account is that even this minimal level of international activity is very rare. Clearly, too, these are "single-shot" events, not easily repeated, or systematically infused into another social fabric. To cast the situation in the jargon of science, we have a case of terrorism functioning as a dependent variable, not as an independent variable.

It is not the raw events which determine the label, but which groups succeed in defining the situation in terms of their own primary interests. Thus, in examining Soviet policy toward international terrorism, Robert O. Freedman draws attention to the thoroughly contradictory nature of the Soviet position. The Soviet Union considers the struggle of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to be "a just anti-imperialist struggle," while the two Lithuanian separatists attempting to model themselves after Palestinian skyjackers are regarded as "criminal murderers." Nor is the Soviet position uniquely ambiguous or contradictory, although it would be fair to add that Marxist thought has a general problem with sanctioning much less condoning terrorist efforts.

As another case in point, the editor of this study, Yonah Alexander, in an otherwise exemplary essay on Arab-Jewish encounters from 1880 through 1947, places the entire blame for the current malaise on the shoulders of the Arabs who opposed the formation of the state of Israel. When he is compelled to point out acts which customarily are defined by social researchers as terrorist in nature, such as Haganah's blowing up roads and bridges linking Palestine with its neighboring countries, kidnapping military officers from the military club in Tel Aviv, holding hostages, and finally blowing up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem which contained British military personnel (which resulted in ninety-one killed and forty-five injured, soldiers, civilians, British, Arabs and Jews), Alexander refers to such acts without characterizing them as terrorist.

We are faced not simply with a problem of methodology—of locating the dependent variable—but equally with a problem in theory, since what we label "terror" in some instances may very well be referred to as acts of liberation in other instances. The identification of acts of terrorism must be made on an empirical basis in each situation. Clandestine efforts to blow up the German military staff or to assassinate Hitler may be described as terrorist by some persons and as acts of patriotism by others. Judgment must be sought not in evaluating the physical act but in measuring its overall purpose in relation to the social system as a whole. This

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STORROW DRIVE

*The rain, a green mask over Storrow Drive;
the night, making a Rembrandt portrait of your face;
the river, dark enough to be another lane;
you, driving, I, beside you, misreading signs.
Was it last night? Last year? Last week?*

*I was playing Mother, saying:
fasten your seat belt, please,
hoping you would say the same.*

*You explained: Accidents happen
too fast for preparations.
Enjoy the direction.
Goals are what we need.*

*Too dark to part the autos from momentum;
too dark to see if you smiled or not,
the wheels made another road between
the vehicle and the street.*

*We were a bridgehead,
a moving island,
safe against the overflowing world,
indestructible but temporal,
transients on Storrow Drive.*

Diana Der Hovanessian

is not to deny the existence of clandestine groups aiming to destroy state power by the use of paramilitary techniques. It is to question whether such activities have a unified international character, and hence whether one can adopt a universal posture, based on either law or science, toward such acts.

There are two distinctive aspects which have created a world of problems for those analyzing terrorism. One might be called definitional, the other ethical. To resort to the Oxford English Dictionary is to surrender to tautology: "terrorism is government by intimidation carried out by the party in power." This dictionary vision is inadequate, if not grossly misleading. For the most part, "terrorism" has now come to mean acts of violence by those *outside* official power.

If falling back upon the Oxford English Dictionary won't help, what will? Bernard Johnpoll terms terrorism "the politics of futility." He sees terrorism not as a revolutionary instrument but as a romantic outburst. Revolution requires pragmatic idealists, we are told, not visionary romantics. On the other hand, a careful examination of specific terrorist groups leads one to feel that they do not in fact represent the kind of romanticism assigned to them—unless romanticism is being used in a Teutonic sense in which violence is itself held to be ultimate expression of

romance. Robert Freedman sees terrorism and guerrilla activity as synonymous. We are once more assured that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. But such extreme relativism invalidates the notion of terrorism as an explanatory variable. Curiously, the more social scientists indulge in rhetorical flourishes, the more uncertain they seem to be of their definitions. Edward Weisband and Damir Roguly, in describing the Palestinians, see "the terrorist as his own torch and bomb: he ignites the flames of national passion and, if possible, of political sympathy, and he does it by violating universal sensibilities." But if terrorism is part of a national movement of protest and redemption, whose are the human sensibilities which are being violated, and how universal can these be said to be? The further assumption that terrorism is violence uninformed by politics ignores the fact that terror sustained over time is always informed by politics.

Among all of these attempts to define terrorism there is no attempt to define international terrorism. So even if we have some level of clarity about the generic nature of terrorism, a dubious but at least interesting assumption, this tells us precious little with regard to international terrorism. L.C. Green, while providing us with a well-balanced Canadian perspective, speaks of international terrorism as "the loss of inno-

cent lives." But that is a consequence of all terrorism: the problem of victims and third-party innocents. It is hardly peculiar to the international arena. In a summary of the response to international terrorism within the United Nations, Seymour Maxwell Finger outlines a possible minimal consensus that this international body might achieve (but so far has not). Unfortunately, the proclamation reads more like a Calvinist ban on sexual intercourse than a political statement on principles of terrorism. Terror is constantly referred to as "the act."

1. The act must be committed or take effect outside the territory of a state of which the alleged offender is a national.
2. The act must be committed or take effect outside the territory of the state against which the act is directed.
3. The act must not be committed either by or against a member of the armed forces of a state in the course of military hostilities.

But alas, Mr. Finger has to point out that such a modest proposed draft could have no effect on black South Africans fighting against white South Africans, nor would it affect Arab attacks in or against the state of Israel. In short, even if the mildest United Nations resolution were to be enacted, it would represent a moral posture with the same chance of worldwide implementation as Calvinist prescriptions against free love.

When we come to the ethics of terrorism, we can clearly see that the nature of the social structure is in judgment. The strategies used either to overthrow or defend that structure are more properly subordinate concerns. In his foreword to Prof. Alexander's book, Arthur Goldberg speaks of international terrorism as "a clear and present danger to the very existence of civilization itself." Civilization, not terror, is at stake. When another jurist, Carlos Marighera, earlier declared that "to be labeled a terrorist in Brazil is an honor, because such a person is fighting the monstrosity of the present dictatorship," he was drawing attention to conditions that he claims justify terror—not to the nature of terror as such.

The proliferation and sophistication of modern technology coupled with the probability that more guerrilla groups will appear, has led some to argue in the volume that the danger of terrorism is unbearable. Therefore, forms of terror which move beyond the sporadic become a menace to the survival of civilization. However, since terrorist activities are rarely conducted by starving masses, it seems unlikely that civilization will be menaced directly by population booms. Beyond that, the proliferation and sophistication of modern tech-

nology, while quite real and frightening, do not go together like ham and eggs. Indeed, the nuclear age testifies to greater sophistication and much narrower proliferation of significant weaponry. The arms acquired by the state apparatus are overwhelmingly superior to those used by terrorist organizations. It is true that the complexity of civilization is such that even simple acts of terrorism may cause great disruption. But it would be wrong to assume that terrorists themselves utilize sophisticated modern technology. A banana peel on which a donkey slips hardly creates a ripple in the economy; but a small obstruction placed on a superhighway might create four-hour delays. It is not necessarily the sophistication of military hardware but the overdevelopment of industrial civilization that seems most serviceable to terrorist ambitions.

Probably the most sanguine view of the general situation is that taken by J. Boyer Bell in describing the Irish perspective, if indeed not the IRA perspective.

All the actors feel legitimate and all act within a tradition that authorizes their strategies and limits their tactics. Each is a patriot, none a murderer. All are rational, some even reasonable, their course, if singleminded, set from a partially understood past toward a specific if improbable goal. As with most other lethal political questions, the ground has been strewn with myths, special pleading, fine slogans, and elegant rationalizations. The distant observer may select from the lot; but the burden here is relatively simple. Even if the perceptions of those involved differ from those of the alien eye, the gunmen are not mindless and their strategies and tactics are shaped by tradition and policy.

The difficulty with the compassionate view of terror is not so much definitional as empirical. It is not so much that all actors feel legitimate but that all claims by combatants to the right of governance seem somehow illegitimate. It might be argued that the history of the Irish problem is a history of competing illegitimacies. The Irish Republic would not now accept Ulster as a gift. Ulster, despite its Protestant majority, cannot be independent and survive without British support, and the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland cannot possibly survive without their incorporation into a Greater Ireland. What was reputedly uttered by a confederate leader about a secessionist state in the United States can perhaps also be said of Northern Ireland: it is too small to be a nation and too large to be an insane asylum, although it has elements of both. As a result, competing interests continue to carry out their terrorist acts

in a tangle of tradition and modernity that will probably end only when all parties expire in exhaustion.

It is time for social scientists to make decisions about political systems and governments rather than moral decisions about the nature of terrorism. The charge of terrorism becomes obscurantist precisely to the degree that it blots out any complex analysis of political and social systems, and the relationships between states, in favor of a simplistic analysis of minor military adventures. Terrorism has eluded definition precisely because it represents a strategy at best, and more conventionally a tactic, within which all social systems operate.


Terrorism can be highly ineffectual as it has been historically in the United States, or highly effective as it has been in Northern Ireland and in parts of Latin America. It can be condemned as totally immoral in relation to Palestinian attacks on Israelis, and similarly, pronounced quite moral (sometimes by the same people) in relation to black African attacks on the apartheid system of South Africa. Sometimes terrorism serves as an instrument of power

and the powerful; i.e., the sponsorship of assassination activities by Libya in Italy and the United States in Chile. At the other end, terrorism is an occasional cry in the wilderness of political anomie. With recent airport bombings in New York City, the anomic character of terrorism has reached new levels; we are confronted with acts that no one even takes credit for. Such events have a nonrational character; unlike most forms of terrorism, they lack definable actors, much less explicit goals. The study of contagion effects is sure to be high on the agenda of future research concerning terrorism.

Opposition to terrorism easily assumes a lawless social universe and fails to consider the sources of essential human organization. In other words, the false dialectical model that people swear by often underwrites contrasting attitudes toward terrorism. If one assumes the normative "natural-law" character of human organization, a large variety of acts that break the membranes of society are viewed as terrorist. But those for whom law and order are at best cynical words in the hands of those who convert raw power into symbolic legitimacy, find it exceedingly difficult to be disturbed by disruptive acts

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of terror. Terrorism is a litmus test of our sentiments. It tells us less about terrorism than about our own wish to survive in a perilous world.

Terrorism, whether as an activity or an object of study, offers no magic formulas for simplifying the world. We are ultimately thrown back on our sense of values concerning the nature of different societies, attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism, and whether mass needs should be satisfied or bottled up. Writings on terrorism often carry a hidden agenda: statements about how society has treated us as individuals living everyday lives in an everyday world. This proposition is not reducible to a simplistic relativism which washes away moral dilemmas, i.e., terrorism is not simply in the eye of the beholder. Because terrorism does exist at the level of strategy and tactics of those out of power, and also as a tool

of constituted governments, discussion of it is rhetoric which disguises an unspoken commitment either to faith in the social order or to infidelity toward that order. Whatever the outcome of definitional and ethical questions, the empirical problems remain to be solved. A firm beginning would be to collapse the rhetoric of "international terrorism" into more manageable packages of "national terrorism." Beyond that, the study of local and regional dissatisfaction must take place in an atmosphere which genuinely takes account of all the actors in the drama, and is not confined within research designs that amount to a defense of regimes in power or of movements in search of power. We are thrown back upon Goethe's suggestion that the post-Christian world represents a conflict of competing goods rather than a ritualistic choice of good over evil. □

THE DUEL THAT IS VERTICAL

*Nearing the world of nine
Novembers, he astounds you,
makes you dream of re-runs,
maddens you for missing what
can only happen once or never.
Cheek against your arm, he asks
you how we hear—exactly how.
You talk of waves, vibrations,
timpani and then give up.
Lately you give up on more
and more—on God, on death,
on whether goldfish sleep
or where the sky stops.*

*Before
undoubtful doubts, you stand
on ignorance.*

*You stall the vaccination
of the facts.*

*You answer mystery
with mystery.*

*Headed as a pair
for sleep, you play a game
that knights you in the name
of wonder.*

*Flying buses
stand for jets—freighters
are sea-trucks—applause is happy
noise, and so on.*

He leads.

You counter.

*Almost asleep,
he tells you how he dreams
of chasing lions through Alaska
on his bike.*

*You ask him
if he's heard there are
no lions in Alaska.*

*He says
there are if he can dream there are.
Before undreamers undeceive him,
you believe him, dream by dream.*

Samuel Hazo

ample. It is also evident that Young did not intend his letters to be published; in fact, he frequently apologizes for their "dullness" and for the desultoriness of his hastily written, poorly typed or pen-scratched messages. Still a picture and a feeling of the man emerge. Besides letters to near relations, there are many to Julian Huxley, Ellen Glasgow, Allen Tate and to a host of editors, teachers, poets, actors and critics.

Young was pre-eminently a Southerner. Not simply because he was born one—so were his fellow critics Joseph Wood Krutch and John Mason Brown—but his sense of life, his nostalgia, his hope for the perpetuation of something he once

'The Whole World Is Getting Cheap'

STARK YOUNG—A LIFE IN THE ARTS: Letters, 1900-1962. Edited by John Pillington. Louisiana State University Press. 2 volumes. 1,454 pp. \$50.

HAROLD CLURMAN

In the history of the earlier 20th-century American theatre, there have been only two critics who have strongly impinged on its literature: George Jean Nathan and Stark Young.

Through his education, his European travels, his knowledge of foreign languages and his histrionic sophistication and flair—he was something of a show-off—Nathan made the more alert public aware of the world of the theatre beyond the Broadway horizon. He was in no sense a profound critic but he championed Ibsen and Shaw when they were still caviar to the general, and he was the first to beat the drum for O'Neill. He began writing his most valuable reviews in 1905; their impact began to diminish by the end of the 1920s.

Stark Young, who began his career as a theatre critic in 1921 at the age of 40, brought a refined aesthetic disposition to his view of the theatre. Most important, he knew that it was a single art of which all the components had to be judged as integral to the whole production or performance. Himself an occasional painter (he exhibited his pictures at various galleries in 1946-47) he had an especially keen appreciation of décor and costume. His observation of acting and directing was more particu-

lar and probing in its sensibility than that of any previous American critic and to this day he has not been surpassed in this regard. He was a man of considerable education and culture—deeper and more extensive than Nathan's. While Nathan was a hornblower for artists he admired, Young's criticism moved toward poetry. He had an ear for the *tone* of each production, and sought in each staged play the soul which imbued it and the "music" it created.

One reason why so few of our theatre critics have achieved any true distinction is that hardly any of them are men of stature, interesting individuals apart from the temporary and limited prestige of their jobs. "If you amount to nothing," Young says, "your art in the end amounts to nothing." Stark Young was *somebody*.

The best of an artist is in his art. The rest is only the sediment of his mundane behavior. No biography of Stark Young exists as yet. But perhaps none is now needed because the most complete view of his personality in its flaws as well as in its admirable features is to be found in the vast collection of his letters recently issued by the Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge, splendidly edited by John Pillington. They have, besides other assets, a special documentary value as Americana.

Not that Young wrote great letters as did Shaw, though the extent of his correspondence was extraordinary. Even so, much is omitted: love letters, for ex-

knew in the native landscape, even to a considerable degree his style, all stem from the southland. Though he enjoyed some of the razzle-dazzle of New York, he never felt really at ease anywhere far from his birthplace—except possibly in Italy and there mostly in Florence. He recognized the inevitability of industry's rampage but he could never be reconciled to it. New York which "points to what the world is going to be," he wrote in 1921, "leaves one longing for the dream of something smaller and seemingly more complete at least in its meaning." His roots were close to the traditional, classically oriented, Southern aristocracy: the planting class. Though not a committed "agrarian," he wished that some of agrarianism's fundamental values could be retained as a corrective or guide to offset what he called "trash-mindedness" which the proliferation of the machine plus business had fostered.

What in Young's estimation was Southern? He speaks of Poe as Southern in "the formalism of his tone, the drift toward rhetoric, the aloof or elusive intensity." What he most intimately associated with the South was "the life of the affections in some beloved air." The salient feature of his letters is his great capacity for friendship. He calls the people he cares about and who care for him "cousin" whether or not they were so related. He hungers for the comfort and solace of graceful manners, a lordly warmth. "The strong belong to the weak through love," he writes.

No wonder then that in the midst of Manhattan he came to feel that "the whole world is getting cheap" and that "sometimes I feel that America is unbearable." As a theatre critic for *The New York Times* he lasted one season—1924-25—because its publisher thought his reviews "too abstract."

Yet—very humanly!—he desired general acceptance in the vulgar marketplace in which destiny had placed him. How desperately he craved praise from his inferiors, almost as much as from his peers. He tries to disguise the pleasure he feels at being wanted by Paramount Pictures. He hoped in 1922 to do "something distinguished with his reviews" and adds "at any rate the theatre will know I am in town . . . for I try to say what I think aesthetically, which is something they are unaccustomed to." But in 1939 he writes, "I have used a great deal of good taste with a very small reward, and neglected to use some good old bad taste, that might have worked wonders."

Broadway might have mistaken his manner for prissiness, though such an allegation would have been false, but misunderstanding was in any case un-

avoidable. There were other reasons too for his separation from the tendencies of his day, many of which he found abrasive, causing pustules of malice and spite to show on the skin of his politeness.


Philosophically, Young may be described as a Platonic idealist. His style often suggests a reaching for the ineffable, an ascent toward a star of meaning which must forever elude definition. The result is often stimulating as well as beautiful and occasionally gaspingly unfulfilled. The effort, when it was pursued without the encumbrance of untranslated quotations in Latin, Greek or Italian, made his theatre criticism genuinely significant. For opinion alone is not criticism. But it was precisely the genuineness of the kind of criticism he wrote that puzzled those persons who must be persuaded by an author who seeks general popularity. It is perhaps not a paradox that Young's civil war novel, *So Red the Rose*, published in 1934, was much more transparently written and partly on that account became a best seller and material for a movie.

Young eschewed the admixture of social and political comment which characterized the writing of many of his colleagues in the weekly and monthly journals during the 1930s. This was a further factor in his estrangement from his contemporaries. He was not so much stupid about politics as essentially unconcerned with them, and in one instance so unknowing that he was able to write in 1931, "I saw Mussolini who was very warm and intelligent, and several times saw their remarkable Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grandi, who had me to dine." In addition he wrote with palpable pride that he had "just received a decoration from the King of Italy and the government, *Commander of the Crown of Italy*." But in this I see his thirst for important recognition rather than a strong reactionary bent. He frequently speaks as if he were unsure of his position, indeed as though he were a failure.

At times his insecurity rendered him almost laughably ingenuous. He deplores literary "wire-pulling," the use of complimentary citations from his friends on the publication of his novels, plays, memoirs, translations, but he is constantly requesting them. At every turn he explains and all but puffs the virtues of his writing. He cherishes those who praise him and becomes mean when he detects even mild resistance to his work.

Though certainly no anti-Semite, he is led to refer to several adverse reviewers of his fiction as "young Jews" or "New York Jews." And once writing to a priest in Rome he points out that his

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ancestors could be traced back to a lady who came to our country with the lost colony of Virginia in 1580, and tongue in cheek adds, "so I am really more American than Irving Berlin." He was wrong about that! But it was his wound and alienation from his immediate environment that is the source of such breaches of his high-mindedness.

At his best—and human beings should always be judged on that ground—he was one of those distinguished figures in our culture most often forgotten, especially in the theatre. He maintained lofty standards, and if he had limitations, they were the vices of his quali-

ties. He stood for something, and so he wrote with some bitterness, "in New York nobody represents anything." (In our society a point of view is a dangerous thing.) Because he was what he was his criticism is not only readable, as is that of very few others, but often inspiring. I still recommend him to students to acquaint them with the nature of criticism in the theatre—which in the course of their reading of current theatrical journalism they might never get to know. Besides their other assets, his *Letters* offer a broad view of the cultural spectrum in the years between the 1920s and the mid-1940s. □

Poetry and the 'Back of the Book'

GRACE SCHULMAN

This is Part I of an essay whose second section will appear next week.

In the poetry editor's office at *The Nation*, there is a wall of shelves filled with books on history and current affairs, such as *The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents*, *Who's Who in Labor* and *The Congressional Directory*. From bound volumes of *The Nation* below them come the massed voices of the century's poets, essayists and critics.

For more than a century the work of established writers, as well as promising new ones, has appeared in *The Nation's* so-called "back of the book"—that section dealing with the arts in contrast with public affairs. In *The Nation's* first issue, dated July 6, 1865, and subtitled *A Weekly Journal Devoted to Politics, Literature, Science, and Art*, the publisher, Joseph H. Richards, spoke of the arts in his credo: "The criticism of books and works of art will form one of its most prominent features; and pains will be taken to have this task performed in every case by writers possessing special qualifications for it." The first editor, Edwin Lawrence Godkin, wrote of world events but also considered philosophical trends generated by writers such as Thomas Carlyle and John Stuart Mill. And literary figures were among the original contributors: Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Charles Eliot Norton, Bayard Taylor, James Russell Lowell, John Greenleaf Whittier, Samuel Eliot, Henry James and W.D. Whitney.

Although the first issue included a

poem that was more topical than literary, dealing with the Civil War ("The American Struggle," by Aubrey de Vere), *The Nation's* poems and criticism have been more consistently literary, whatever their subject matter. In one sense, then, the "front" and "back" of the book are disparate entities. In a more subtle way, though, they are related. To know literature is to apprehend works of art as they exist in time, and *The Nation's* concern with precisely what is happening at a given moment has afforded a sophisticated perspective on books for the past 110 years.

The earliest event to break the closed circles of politics and poetry was, of course, the American Civil War, whose shadow fell across the front and back of the book, simultaneously. An unsigned review of Walt Whitman's *Drum-Taps* appeared in *The Nation* on Thursday, November 16, 1865. The reviewer (Henry James at 22) said that the poem "exhibits the effort of an essentially prosaic mind to lift itself, by a muscular strain, into poetry." He asserted:

Like hundreds of other good patriots, during the last four years, Mr. Walt Whitman has imagined that a certain amount of violent sympathy with the great deeds and sufferings of our soldiers, and of admiration for our national energy, together with a ready command of a picturesque language, are sufficient inspiration for a poet. If this were the case, we had been a nation of poets. The constant developments of the war moved us continually to strong feeling and to strong expression of it.

The reviewer objected to Whitman's abandonment of structural devices ("Frequent capitals are the only marks of

verse in Mr. Whitman's writing. . . . *Drum-Taps* begins for all the world like verse and turns out to be arrant prose.") He wrote that "no triumph, however small, is won but through the exercise of art and . . . this volume is an offense against art."

The writer called for poetry that embodied America's crisis and, at the same time, transfigured it.

This democratic, liberty-loving, American populace, this stern and war-tried people, is a great civilizer. It is devoted to refinement. If it has sustained a monstrous war, and practised human nature's best in so many ways for the last five years, it is not to put up with spurious poetry afterwards. To sing aright our battles and our glories it is not enough to have served in a hospital (however praiseworthy the task in itself), to be aggressively careless, inelegant, and ignorant, and to be constantly preoccupied with yourself.

A year later, an article called "More Poetry of the War" appeared, addressed to *Battle Pieces and Aspects of the War* by Herman Melville, who perceived the Civil War's tragic significance. The reviewer wrote:

. . . Accustomed as we have been of late, in certain works professing to be poetry, to astonishing crudity and formlessness, we yet cannot refrain from expressing surprise that a man of Mr. Melville's literary experience and cultivation should have mistaken some of these compositions for poetry, or even for verse. There are some of them in which it is difficult to discover rhythm, measure or consonance of rhyme.

On the other hand, the reviewer praised "Commemoration Ode," by James Russell Lowell ("not only among the finest works of our generation, but among the noblest poems of all time"), and "The Old Sergeant," by Forceythe Wilson.

My reason for recalling those views is not to underline their dimness but, on the contrary, to show their struggle to perceive new directions in modern poetry and in poetic form during times of political upheaval and death. In 1968, Robert Bly was to observe, in an essay called "On Political Poetry" that appeared in *The Nation*, that the true political poem moves inward, deepening awareness of the self. Other poets, such as Michael Hamburger, have noted that war poems tend to assimilate prose rhythms. What Henry James considered formless and self-indulgent was actually profound self-awareness and a deliberate affinity with prose. In Whitman's *Drum-Taps*, "Reconciliation," for example, ends with the lines: "I draw near, / Bend down and touch lightly with my lips the white face in the coffin." And ironically, the emphasis on self, a device that fore-

shadowed the modern poet's use of the self to permit discoveries on a deep psychic level, was an essential characteristic of Henry James's later work, e.g., *The Ambassadors*.

One reason for *The Nation's* early negative evaluations of the poetry of Whitman and Melville might have been a theory that critical skepticism was synonymous with growth. As one critic put it in *The Nation's* first issue, in a new country, chaos marks the first stage of criticism and "silly admiration" characterizes the second. To reach maturity, criticism had to pass through the admiring stage to one of fairly general censure.

As *The Nation* persisted in studying the direction of American letters, critics came to regard Walt Whitman's poetry with greater esteem, considering it distinctively national. On January 2, 1868, J.R. Dennett wrote that he was a "truly American poet" who "may well be honored as a preacher of democracy—democracy in its wider, humanitarian sense." And by 1905, fourteen years after Whitman's death, *The Nation's* poetry reviewer praised him above all American poets.

In the 1860s, when volumes of English writers such as Tennyson, Carlyle and Burke still dominated many American bookshelves, *The Nation* reported in its first issue of July 6, 1865, "an increasing interest in things American." Ticknor & Fields of Boston, a leading American publisher, advertised five new books of poems, only one of them by an English poet, Alfred, Lord Tennyson. The others were by Americans: *Household Poems* by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow; *National Lyrics* by John Greenleaf Whittier; *Humorous Poems* by Oliver Wendell Holmes; *Religious Poems* by Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe.

The Nation's literary comment included books that dealt with the woods and cities of a growing America. In its second year, on August 2, a reviewer said, in connection with Hawthorne's *Note-Book*, "the Concord River in rain and shine, a wet day in the fall, an exasperating walk in the underbrush, are perfectly depicted. . . ." And on July 19, 1866, a critic made a striking comparison between a national issue and literary currents. Longfellow's *On Translating the Divina Commedia* and Bryant's "The Death of Slavery" have in them, he wrote, the same image, embodied in similar language. In one case the image refers to Dante's Hell; in the other, to the American institution of slavery. While Longfellow addresses the shade of the "poet Saturnine" ("I enter and see thee in the gloom . . . make room

/ For thee to pass"), Bryant addresses the shade of the "Great Wrong" ("Lo the foul phantoms, silent in the gloom / of the flown ages, part to yield thee room").

In those early issues, a surprising number of essays about literary women, such as Catherine Fanshawe and Margaret Fuller, appeared in the "back of the book." As for the "body section" of the journal, the woman-suffrage issue was frequently in the news. Moreover, women wrote for *The Nation*: Jessie White Mario covered Italy for *The Nation* from 1866 to 1906, and the Countess Catherine Károlyi, wife of the first President of the Hungarian Republic, wrote about Europe in the 1920s.

In the 1860s, essays about women writers have a curious resemblance to those of our time. In an unsigned review called "A Woman in the Pulpit," *The Nation's* contributor wrote that Gail Hamilton, author of *A New Atmosphere*, was a maiden lady who advocated women's right to remain single and to be treated with respect. Though shrill, she must be heeded:

As critics, we must regret her style; it is muscular, ungraceful, and wants taste, and does not attain the artistic. We deprecate her tone. . . . But because she pleads for a higher life—because she assails coarseness and brutality in men—because she proclaims to twenty-nine thousand sisters in her native State that they may be happy and useful women, even though destined never to know the happiness of wife and mother—and because she increases strength, we forgive her for being noisy and devoid of art.

Although the review is not listed in *The Nation's* index it is presumably the work of a man since, apart from Gail Hamilton herself, there were no women among the original contributors. He wrote that New England cannot shelve her book as a tract: "It is the cry of its women. In many respects it is the résumé of the wants and thoughts of all women who are other than passive beings."

The subject of women novelists was dear to Henry James, who praised George Sand with understanding and without condescension. On July 2, 1868, he celebrated George Eliot as novelist, romancer, poet, philosopher and moralist. On July 16, he wrote: "To read George Sand in America was to be a socialist, a transcendentalist, and an abolitionist." Actually, he claimed, she is superior to Thackeray and Dickens in many ways. "Whereas those writers expressed in a satisfactory manner certain facts, certain ideas of a peculiar and limited order, Mme. Sand expresses with equal facility and equal grace ideas and

facts the most various and the most general." He asserted that "the movement of Mme. Sand's thoughts seems to us as free as the air of heaven," and suggested that she "contemplates all things with a superior and impartial mind."

A colorful, controversial critic of poetry was Col. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, who wrote regularly on contemporary verse for *The Nation* from 1877 through 1904, just seven years before his death. Colonel Higginson, who had been a pastor of Unitarian churches in Massachusetts, was an abolitionist and a friend of John Brown. In the Civil War he became colonel of the first Negro regiment, the First South Carolina Volunteers. Wounded in the war, he retired in 1864 to a life of writing and of furthering liberal reforms, including the woman-suffrage movement.

In American literary history, he is known, unfortunately, for his obtuseness regarding the genius of Emily Dickinson. In 1861, sixteen years before he came to *The Nation*, he had, in a "Letter to a Young Contributor" in *The Atlantic Monthly*, advised beginners to avoid prolixity and high-flown language. "Change your style with life," he said, and Emily Dickinson rejoined, in a letter that contained poems, "Are you too deeply occupied to say if my Verse is alive?"

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Although he judged her work unfit to publish, he answered her letter, asked for more poems and inquired about her age, her reading and her companionships. He encouraged her, and invited her correspondence. He *noticed* her.

After her death in 1886, Higginson, with Mabel Loomis Todd, prepared the volume of *Poems* that appeared in 1890 and 1891, but with punctuation and even words changed to suit conventional practices. He felt the poems were formless and imperfectly rhymed. He believed they were metrically erratic, unaware that her rhythm, foreshadowing the practice of modern poetry, depended on inner mood and was organic to the subject.

Judging from his work in *The Nation*, however, Colonel Higginson was haunted by the knowledge that he had not published Emily Dickinson's poetry. Her genius hovered over many of his reviews of other writers. Five years after the Amherst poet died, he wrote that Alma Stretell's versions from Greek "deal with nature and time and eternity with a strange directness like that of Emily Dickinson." In 1891, he compared her work with *Black Riders and Other Lines*, by Stephen Crane. Higginson said of Crane, "He grasps his thought as nakedly and simply as Emily Dickinson." In 1900 he remarked of Louise Chandler Moulton's poems: "Many a single verse by Emily Dickinson has more power of imagination than is to be found in this whole volume." And in 1902, in one of the first notices of Edwin Arlington Robinson's "Captain Craig," he wrote that Robinson was "like Dickinson when she piques your curiosity through half a dozen readings and suddenly makes all clear."

Forty years after her death, *The Nation*, under Freda Kirchwey, carried a full page of work that was forthcoming in *Further Poems of Emily Dickinson, Withheld from Publication by her Sister, Lavinia*. The book was edited by the poet's niece, Martha Dickinson Bianchi and, when published, was reviewed by Mark Van Doren.

After their publication in 1929, the poems were restored to their original punctuation by Thomas Johnson in 1955. In *The Nation*, however, one of the "Four Poems by Emily Dickinson" read as follows:

*Revolution is the pod
Systems rattle from;
When the winds of will are stirred,
Excellent is bloom.*

*But except its russet base
Every summer be
The entomber of itself;
So of Liberty.*

Left inactive on the stalk,

*All its purple fled,
Revolution shakes it for
Test if it be dead.*

It is one of those rare splendid poems that deal with social change. As blossoms need wind if they are to make more blossoms, nations require constant change to remain free. Written about 1866, the poem embodies an assertion that renewal inspires growth. And its directness and clarity were to characterize poetry of a much later period.

Many of the leaders of the new American poetry were women. H.D. (Hilda Doolittle), on whose poems Ezra Pound had scrawled "H.D., Imagiste," sending them to *Poetry*, gave the movement its name. In 1912, Harriet Monroe had founded *Poetry*, which was to become an outlet for the new art. Margaret Anderson edited *The Little Review*. In an essay on Margaret Anderson's *My Thirty Years' War*, Matthew Josephson wrote of those innovative women in *The Na-*

tion of June 18, 1930:

The revolutions of poetry and art in the United States during the twentieth century were conducted largely by inspired women. These female crusaders and zealots—Amy Lowell, Isadora Duncan, Harriet Monroe, Margaret Anderson, and numerous others—toured and stumped the country in behalf of free dancing, or free love. . . .

The "back of the book" recorded the activities of those inspired women. Although Harriet Monroe became more widely known as founder and editor of *Poetry*, *The Nation* honored her as a poet as early as December 15, 1892. The magazine's reviewer remarked, speaking of her "Commemoration Ode," "the lady has taken a high position among American poets." H.D.'s *Heliodora and Other Poems* was reviewed by Irwin Edwin on November 1, 1924, and Amy Lowell's *What's O'Clock* by Lola Ridge on December 16, 1925. □

TELEVISION / Peter Sourian

French singer Edith Piaf, who died in 1963, is the subject of *I Regret Nothing*, a documentary to be seen on Public TV channels during March. As a figure, her morbid appeal to disaster-fans is reminiscent of Judy Garland's, but she was no Hollywood product and she epitomized something rather different.

Piaf was born on a sidewalk and brought up in a whorehouse when her street-singer mother abandoned the blind child, and her contortionist father, sent off to war, couldn't think of what else to do with her. Recovering her eyesight after a visit to the shrine of Lisieux, she thereafter wore a cross at her throat.

Her own bastard infant, whom she carried with her while singing for coins in the working-class districts of Paris, died of meningitis when Piaf was 19. According to her half sister she then picked up a man who took her to a hotel room but gave her 10 francs and left her alone when he learned that she was soliciting in order to get money for the baby's funeral.

Implicated in the murder of Leplée, her discoverer-impresario, she was finally exonerated through the loyal testimony of friendly pimps. She had scores of lovers, of all imaginable types; it was true love each time, though the most serious lover was middleweight champion Marcel Cerdan, whose funeral was attended by both his wife and Piaf. She made the careers of a half-dozen fine singers, including Yves Montand and Charles Aznavour, by painstakingly shar-

ing her shrewd artistic instincts with them. Her friends included Jean Cocteau, Colette and Marlene Dietrich. Her second marriage was to a Greek hairdresser, a decent and devoted boy twenty-five years her junior; at her death, though she may have been the highest-paid singer in French music-hall history, she left him very much in debt.

Piaf died in her 40s, a sparrow of a woman, monstrously romantic, prodigiously and genuinely generous, cruel, reckless, absolutely and tirelessly devoted to her art—a drunk and a drug addict, her hands pathetically twisted by arthritis, her face deformed by cortisone, with an almost incredible history of auto crashes, surgical operations and internal disorders which probably included cancer.

And then there are her songs, directly inspired if not actually written by herself, in accordance with French music-hall tradition: *Mon Légionnaire*, *L'Accordéoniste*, *La Foule*, *Milord*, *Bal dans ma rue*, *Je ne regrette rien*. . . .

I Regret Nothing is a ninety-minute BBC film, produced by Michael Houldey. In it we first get a brief summary of Piaf's early life, with accompanying still photos. Songs are intercut with interviews with people who knew and worked with her, including Aznavour, who is perceptive and interesting: "When she first sang in New York, some of the audience started to laugh because this type of song was then so unusual in America.

THE DROWNED MAN

*How I love you in your hopeless act.
The black wound on the skin of the pond;
the small body already stiffening:
and so you entered that dark closet of water.*

*But your wife on the shore
turned away from the lost child,
chose the two live children rooted behind her
receiving the permanent visions of their sleep,
chose life,
chose to live with ice at the heart.*

Ellen Bryant Voigt

... She would ask her lyricist if he had found a new way for her to die—fire, water, auto crash, gas, electricity. . . . It was a sort of curiosity to see how much a woman could hold the sadness." Songwriter Michel Emer, a Jew whose clandestine passage out of Occupied France she arranged and paid for, is another witness: "She was always giving money to people, all her life. . . . Now that she is gone, it seems I can no longer write so well." Finally there is footage of her last months, and of Paris at her death, with tens of thousands of people in the streets.

I Regret Nothing demonstrates some of the limitations of such documentary biographies. If you haven't got the footage, you either narrate over still photos, which you can't do for too long, or you skip the event, not because it isn't important but solely because you haven't got it on film, thereby causing fundamental distortions. (After all, what determines the importance of an event has not quite yet become whether a camera was there or not.)

There's very little of Piaf's crucial early life, nothing of her transformation from primitive street singer to sophisticated artist, though the interesting details of this are known, nothing of the excitement of her first successes, and nothing of the grotesque sadism of a high-society crowd which amused itself at her expense in the beginning. Another aspect of the problem is lamentably illustrated when she sings songs for which there is no performance footage, and for which the producer has provided "appropriate" scenes during the voice-over: young technicolor lovers strolling in a technicolor park, and so on. Thus, while we get a nice texture of feeling from those interviewed, bits of actual performance which a book can't give and the terrible final events as filmed, much is missing.

Piaf, the untranslated biography by the singer's half sister, Simone Bertault, demonstrates what a book may better provide in such instances. First, though

it probably was set down with the help of a ghost, its language, that of the streets of Paris, is truly a part of Piaf's story. Then there is the accretion of small detail: Piaf characteristically slept with her fists clenched; she and her sister long believed lice and filth to be protections against illness; the odor pervading the fancy whorehouse where Piaf lived during the war suddenly recalled to her the smells of the modest one she'd known as a blind child twenty-five years earlier.

What *I Regret Nothing* might have done, and did not really attempt, was to convey a sense of the larger significance of Piaf. A life that ends with tens of thousands of ordinary people milling about in the streets may have a significance worth thinking about beyond the prurient appeal to such people as those who tirelessly rode the Judy Garland roller coaster.

Jean Cocteau, himself a *monstre sacré* of a different sort, who died on the same day as his friend and while in the act of composing her eulogy, had once written: "There will never be another like her. She is a star which consumes itself in the solitude of France's nocturnal sky. She contemplates those entwined couples who still know how to love, to suffer, and to die."

To me this is not merely a sentimental remark, nor is it a vague one. It is *romantic*, but in a particular and *real* sense. Piaf's may have been the last naive generation, one whose ordinary members were not materialistic, if only because they simply could not afford it. It was a generation of men and women for whom romance, bitter at the root, was as real a part of their lives as labor (which, they were informed, was equivalent to health), a degree of real hunger, and the almost prideful knowledge that their condition would not change—they could not expect to become bourgeois. Their condition had, after all, scarcely altered since Flaubert wrote his great novella, *A Simple Heart*, a perfect de-

piction of the innocence of nonbourgeois France.

In that world, overwhelmingly dominated by an iron bourgeoisie (Balzac's novels are *not* fantasies), one possible freedom was through the romantic-sexual love of which Piaf *always* sang, and which was curiously decent even when illicit, as for example in Renoir's lovely little film, *A Day In The Country*, made just before the war. Marcel Carné's *Port of Shadows*, with Michèle Morgan, is the classic expression of the attitude.

Those people milling in the streets may have felt that with the end of Piaf, something of their own lives went too; that in social security France sex was now to be increasingly divorced from romantic feeling and increasingly—for them as it had traditionally been for the bourgeoisie—associated with possibilities of material advancement.

I Regret Nothing is part of Festival '76, a group of programs Public TV is presenting during March 7 to 21, as part of its annual public awareness campaign to stimulate individual contributions. It is a pleasantly various collection, with a measure of out-of-the-way shows—tales to wag some of the dogs of commercial TV. There's rare Laurel and Hardy, the Quintero production of *Moon For The Misbegotten*, a nostalgic *Good Old Days*

excuse me professor...

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Of Radio, a *Tribute To Johann Strauss* with the Vienna Philharmonic and *The Time of Your Life*. There's also a behind-the-scenes look at Superbowl Week, ocean racing, a documentary on Mussolini as recalled by his wife and son and documentaries on heart surgery, childbirth, ragtime, pygmies and penguins. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

Philip Pearlstein showed a group of recent nudes at the Allan Frumkin Gallery, along with portraits done in the past three years. The nudes, more suave and harmonious, without any diminution of their complexity and mass, are among his best paintings, but the portraits are another matter. The four sitters, whom I happen to know, are all slightly off as likenesses. There is a kind of physiological equivalent to continental drift, in which the geological plates that make up the earth's surface move, and their boundaries make fault lines. Pearlstein's faces seem to suffer from facial drift, in which different parts of the countenance move in opposition to one another. There is, too, a tendency to partial stereoscopy, in which different bits of the portraits—a hand, a dress pattern, a chair—are more illusionistic than the whole picture. For all the ingenuities of Pearlstein's compositions and placement, the facial awkwardness is damaging to works done as portraits, as individual likenesses.

Alice Neel doesn't have Pearlstein's difficulty in catching a sitter's look and character; on the contrary, her portraits are extended responses to the unique characteristics of her sitters. Even when, as in "Jack Baur," the eyes are completely out of line with each other, she loses neither physical plausibility nor one-to-one resemblance: the image looks just like the sitter. That may be because her style is open and painterly, implying mobility, whereas Pearlstein's surface is closed and neat, showing arrested forms, in which departures from common knowledge look like distortions. Neel's recent show, at the Graham Gallery, revealed her incisive characterization at its most vivid and self-possessed. One sitter described her reaction on being allowed to see the portrait at its completion; she said, without rancor, that she looked like "a little wizened mosquito." This image catches the aggressive aspect of Neel's portraiture very well but, and this is the point, she can do such things without losing the irreducible core of resemblance.

Realists, no matter how attached to

representation, can only *sample* the world in their paintings. In realist painting a part signifies the world in all its extension and profusion. Neel emphasizes by color and paint handling the texture and animation of people and their clothes; Pearlstein does so by close drawing their clenched rugosity. Alex Katz (Marlborough Gallery, through March) defines the world by a supple typology, in which the individuality of sitters and the artist's stylizations are in endless negotiation. Only in "The Light" does stylization blunt the data of observation. His paintings of the last two years are large and so sparing of anecdote and detail as to appear streamlined. In figure after figure acute observation is combined with the transformation of people into signs in paint that has its own physical properties and its own tradition of use. In the large conversation pieces, especially, Katz brilliantly combines degrees of familiar reference and pointed artificiality.

The Surrealists were always finding *pre-Surrealists* in the past, particularly among the Romantics, but that was possibly because Surrealism was in many ways an extension of 19th-century styles and ideas. That this was so is borne out by the fact that as later Surrealism begins to unravel, as movements do in their end phases, it returns to Romanticism, as in the work of an artist like Joseph Cornell. Starting from Max Ernst, Cornell converted collage into lyrical Americana. A show of his boxes, mainly from the 1940s, his best time, is at the Leo Castelli Gallery (until March 20), including works from the estate of the artist, purchased recently by Castelli with two other dealers. Cornell's control of ready-made objects and images is a pleasure to witness: in boxes measuring 10 by 16 inches, or 19 by 13, or 14 by 10, he achieves the precision of a navigator and a butterfly collector's mania for taxonomy. Cornell's imagery, rich as it is in iconographic promise, has still to be analyzed, but its evocative

OUR STORY

*Remind me again—together we
trace our strange journey, find
each other, come on laughing.
Some time we'll cross where life
ends. We'll both look back
as far as forever, that first day.
I'll touch you—a new world then.
Stars will move a different way.
We'll both end. We'll both begin.*

Remind me again.

William Stafford

power is widely felt, a persuasive mix of the idyllic and the elegant.


The exhibition of Paul Feeley (Emmerich, uptown, until March 11) is not the one needed to revive the reputation of this distinguished but neglected painter who died in 1966. It is a loose group of paintings, many of them not on the main line of his development. He developed from poured two-color paintings in the late 1950s to repetitive and centered displays of stenciled balusters and quatrefoils. A majority of the works at Emmerich, however, are marginal, experiments that Feeley did not follow up and variants of ideas given more firmly in other paintings. Nor is his color sense seen at its best: many of the works here are too washy, whereas his special flair was for judgment in the diversity of uninflected, even color.

Robert Rauschenberg's new works (Leo Castelli, downtown, until March 13) are without imagery or objects; they are newly made structures and materials with no prior history of use. They consist of wooden sticks, lengths of muslin or ticking, string, tacks, screw eyes, candidly declared as such. The works hang on the wall, or off the wall, in loose configurations the casualness of which does nothing to reduce the touch of Japonaiserie about the restrained color and whispering modularity of design. Rauschenberg has always been good at improvisation, as in the scatter of forms in his dense-image prints, but here the juggling is purely sensory. It is a spin-off from the printed materials of his last show, a bit thin in the absence of signs, but enormously elegant.

The Fine Arts Building has published a catalogue of last year's exhibition, "Lives," organized by Jeffrey Deitch. Forty artists, from Vito Acconci to Hannah Wilke, are represented by a page each; an introduction by Deitch provides the rationale. He points out that Minimal art, though traditional in its quest for essential form, "actually expanded the arena of art activity" by its stress on aesthetic problems which was picked up by Conceptual artists. Lives as subject matter range from the artist's person to a poll of people unknown to the artist; from erotics to chronologies. Performance of course is central (as in Happenings and in the Events of the Fluxus group), but Deitch is right that narrative is frequently blocked and motivation is diverted, so that we experience many of the presented "Lives" as if they were objects, like the mute forms of Minimal sculpture. The catalogue, a very useful addition to an expanding genre, is available at the Fine Arts Building, 105 Hudson Street, N.Y. □

Crossword Puzzle No. 1624

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

- 1 Not the sort of place to which some dissidents have been sent for "treatment," but they might look for it. (9,6)
- 9 Old political supporters might, but not directly. (9)
- 10 Ruined some of the ground I dug? (5)
- 11 Somehow the rent is put in here. (6)
- 12 Certainly not amateurish examinations, as people who make them might demonstrate. . . . (8)
- 14 and these might be pictured in the rosters of those who are paid for their effort. (8)
- 16 To call up is certainly all right, if it's in the late afternoon. (5)
- 17 Eleven doesn't have the right beginning to be treated as an 11. (5)
- 18 Essential being in a king or queen, for example, given a loving touch. (8)
- 20 An old-fashioned way to stop a case being confused in certain surroundings. (8)
- 21 A jumping Jack was told to be. (6)
- 24 Here in France it's literally bad for coating, perhaps. (5)
- 25 Such would not imply a healthy selection, when one's chill and upset. (3-6)
- 26 At Blackjack, deal another card with nine or ten to cover the main points. (3,3,4,5)

DOWN

- 1 Such an address should imply a sound system for a lot of people. (6)

- 2 Are they used to secure lots of hair? (5)
- 3 Powerful barge mule, or whatever might be depended on. (5,2,8)
- 4 Make better salt, perhaps. (4)
- 5 Not the first thing to visit at the seaside, as a desperate measure. (4,6)
- 6 Evidently not acquired by standing up for what you feel is due you! (9,6)
- 7 The attractive part of classical *Odes to Nero*. (9)
- 8 Times do change! (One who might make a habit of it?) (7)
- 13 As a forger, not so common nowadays. (10)
- 15 Holding back one form of transportation in the remainder? (9)
- 17 English town suggesting the cockney joint has the sound of change. (7)
- 19 Where love is found even in court proceedings. (6)
- 22 People who went to college, thus the deepest type! (5)
- 23 Strike lead, possibly . . . in the garden? (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1623

ACROSS: 1 Literature; 6 and 26 Just imagine; 10 Obesity; 11 College; 12 Bred; 13 How do you do; 15 Custard; 16 Stifles; 17 Interim; 20 Cellini; 22 Animal Farm; 23 Talc; 25 Genteel; 27 Rare; 28 Bricklayer. DOWN: 1 Look Back in Anger; 2 Theseus; 3 and 24 Rainfall; 4 Thyroid; 5 Recedes; 7 Unequal; 8 The coast is clear; 9 Play-bills; 14 Marriages; 18 Thinner; 19 Muffler; 20 Cardiac; 21 Inanity.

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
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